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The purpose of this study is to discover,by quantitative measurements,
the place of monopolies in the national economy and to evaluate the per-.
formanoo of monopolies in terms of economic welfare criteria.
It is felt that consideration of both quantitative measurements and
performance are essential bases for judgment. Q.uantitative measurements
make possible a knowledge of the position of monopolies in the market
structure, and performance affords knowledge for evalue~ion as a competitive
influence.
Scope of Study
This study examines the criteria for economic welfare and attempts to
judge monopolies in this setting. Economic realities compel it to accept
the modern market orgariization,which is far removed from pure competition
and equally so from pure monopoly. It measures the concentration of employ
ment, output, snd income of the economy in order to determine the place and
role of businesses likely to have monopoly power. Moreover, it attempts to
reveal how performance of those businesses, together with the nature of the
structure,conforms to the essential demands of welfare criteria. Selected
case studies are employed as an inquiry for empirical evidence of monopoly
and to reveal the basis for market competition in industries or product
lines whore one or a few companies account for the bulk of the output. The




The changing complexity of our economy has created many problems.
Our system of free enterprise is the counterpart of our political freedom,
freedom of contract, and private property rights. In addition, our
economic freedom means freedom frca~i monopolistic and bureaucratic domination.
The growth of big business and its relative share of employment, output,
and income has generated great concern among small businesses and govern
ment for the general welfare. Elements of fascism are not too distant where
control of the economy rests with too few; likewise, elements of socialism
lurk dangerously near with too much control vested in the government. It
is the small businesses, economists, and concerned consumers who are the
bastions of freedom. They must cause government to bring to bear legal and
political facilities to restrain the growth and abuses of giant businesses.
Even more decidedly, it is the duty of professional and learned economis~ts
to avail themselves for the en)ighten,nent of all. Thus, this study finds its
significance in an attempt to focus clearly upon the economy and form a
valid jud~nent of the part monopolies play toward the satisfaction of the
wants and needs of the general welfare.




Competition is said to be “the condition that exists in a market when
there are an indeterminate number of traders all dealing in the s~ne
product and when no one trader can demand or offer a. quantity sufficiently
1
large materially to affect the market price.”
John Bates Clark hailed competition as a force in the continued im
provement of the production arts. He states:
Competition is the assured guarantee of all such progress.
It causes a race of improvement in which eager rivals strive with
each other to see who can get the best results from a day?s labor.
It puts the producer where he must be enterprising or drop out of
the race. He must invent machines and processes, or adopt them as
others discover them. He must organize, explore markets, and study
consumers’ wants. He must keep abreast of a rapidly moving procession
if he expects to continue long to be a producer at all.2
A. D. H. Kaplan gives a more composite view, when he declares that
The primer of traditional economics is that in a full competi
tive economy the sole arbiter is the market, where values are
determined through the price mechanism. It is the c~iipetitive
market that organizes, integrates, and basically directs the
activities and decisions of buyers and sellers, producers and con
sumers. Through competition, the desire for profit tends to be
directed into socially beneficønt channels, as sellers find where
demand is most favorable among alternative market outlets and buyers
make their choice among alternatives sources of supply. Thus compe
tition, working through the free market, serves to reconcile self-
interest with mutual interest, to bring about the most satisfactory
allocation and most effective use of resources. It puts the producer
where he must be enterprising or drop out of the race.3
1Harold D. Sloan and A. J. Zuroher, A Dictionary of Economics, 58.
2A. D. H. Kaplan, Big Enterprise in a Competitive System (Washington,
1954), pp. 43-44, quoting John Bates Clark, Essentials of Economic Theory




The presumption is made that competitors are able to choose freely
and intelligently among alternatives for disposing of their funds, services,
or products. Such activities for economic rewards will bring into being
the richest variety of productive effort and satisfaction of wants.
The foregoing postulates might well be summed as the basic evidence
of effective competition. Such conditions would make possible the reali.
zation of the basic aim of the economic system. Theodore Morgan expresses
it as “the highest production reasonably possible of those goods and services
which best satisfy human wants~ and high employment is best looked on as a
means to, end a by product of, this high production. Hence. • .we are con
oerned...with production and productivity. The purpose of production is
fulfillment of human wants.”1 This observation leads to the next point
in the line of expectations, that is, efficiency. Consumers not only ex
pect efficiency; they demand it. The producer feels this impact in the
demand for his products. There must be an efficient allocation and use of
all resources. It is desirable to have maximum production with least ex
penditure.
Tibor Scitovaky comments on economic efficiency — “in the economist’s
eyes consumer is king; and the aim of our analysis was to see...whether
the economic system conforms or can be made to conform to the consumers
wishes.”2 There must be conformity with consumer preferences. Along with
effective use of allocated resources must go equity. There must be an
equitable allocation or distribution of want satisfying goods or services.
1Theodore Morgan., Income and Employment (New Yoik, 1947), pp. 2,3.
2Tibor Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition (Chicago, 1951), p. 51.
I Ij~ I]!~.]J ~.:.: .!;,!!. ~ !!~•.!~•..•.
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The problem of keeping pace and changing necessarily involves shifts in
resources or policies. “Any change of economic policy or institution cap
able of making some people better off without making anyone worse off is
a change that improves economic efficiency. A situation in which it would
be impossible to make anyone better off without making someone else worse
1
off, therefore, will be called an economically efficient situation.” Here
again is the importance of equity consideration. “One person’s gain must be
2
weighed against the other’s loss.”
In addition to economic efficiency with consideration to equity,
Scitovsky discusses technological efficiency, which demands that there must
be “greater output with given resources or a given oubput with the least
input resources, a condition of maxiiuiun profit.”3 As to the efficient
allocation of resources,Scitovsky states that - “to produce an industry’s
output with a minimum input of a given factor, output must be so allocated
among the members of the industry that the marginal J.nput of that factor
is the same in every firm.”4 He states further that “in the long run...
efficient organization involves, in addition to efficient resources and
output allocation, production in the optimum number of firms anSI the
elimination either of inefficiency within the individual firms or of the
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exist.
It was poin~d out above that the consumer is king, arid his action or
wishes are felt in the demand curve. Consumer preference must be reflect
ed in the market price of consumer~ goods and thus known to producers,
“...this condition is fulfilled whenever competition among consumers is
perfect,...in such a case the price of each consumer~ good equals and ex
presses its marginal valuation by all its oonsumers...eaCh person’s ~iote
1
is weighed by his expenditure.”
“The main function of economic policy is considered by most economists
2
to be the maintenanoe of employment and price stability.” The maintenance
3
of employment means the highest production possible, as discussed above in
Morgan’s comments. Employment may be defined as, “engagement in an
4
occupation, business, trade or profession.H
Inherent in the economic efficiency, as discussed in the fbregoing
page3, is an equitable distribution of income. By income, we mean, “the
money return or other material benefits arising from the use of wealth or
5
from the services of free human bajngs.~~
Under competition it is then expected that there wiUbe full ~uploy
merit, the highest production possible, and an equitable distribution of
‘Ibid., p. 182. -
2lbid., p. 444.
3production is defined as the “process of increasing the capacity of
goods to satisfy human desires or of rendering services capable of satisfy





income. These factors of necessity move’ in the same direction if not
at the same rate, which implies that any condition of one will have ulti
mate effects on the other in a similar mamier. The social maximization of
income, output, and employment is the major goal of the economy in welfare
economics. As an overall view, then,economic welfare is 11the attainment
of economic well-being resulting from the receipt of an adequate share of
the results of production commensurate with the time, effort, and ingenuity
1
utilized in the process of production.” Where production is maintained,
high employment is maintained. High employment carries security for the
entire economy but much importance is attached to individual security.
One. other important element demands consideration and that is the
manner or method of measurement of production and income. Theodore Morgan
feels that
The purpose of production is fulfillment of human wants...the
most useful common measure of the vast pile of goods and services
that make ~p the national output in any period of time. . . is the
money value of those goods and services...the national product of
a given year as the money value of economic goods and services
produced in that year - that is, the money value of all products
of business and government activity — of extraction (as in mining,
forestry, fishing and agriculture), manufacturing, transportation,
trade and direct services to consumers.2
Other evidence of the validity of money value as a measurement is
asserted by Professor Pigou:
1B. J. Horton, Julien Ripley and M. B. Sohnapper, Dictionary of Modern
Economics, 109.
2
Theodore Morgan, op. cit., p. 3. /Ltional output includes only
goods and services sold, exceptions (government production, defense —
army, nay, etc., services and goods - roads, bridges), goods retained
for own consumption - payments in goods made to ultimate consumers of
goods - rental value of home owners who live in them. Only le,~i~~~ate
business. Capitaljains and “non—economic activities (rackets, loot,
etc.) are excluded7.
1 I J!Iit~ ~J].~INk,I~I~IU
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Methods of science seem likely to work at best advantage.
This they can clearly do when there is present something measur
able, on which analytical machinery can got a firm grip. The one
obvious instrument of measurement available in social life is
money. Hence, the range of our inquiry becomes restricted to
that part of social welfare that can be brought directly or in
directly into relation with the measuring rod of money. This part
of welfare may be called economic welfare.’
He continues:
Just as economic welfare is that part of total welfare which
can be brought directly or indirectly into relation with a money
measure, so the national income (dividend) is that part of the
objective income of the community-, includ&hg of course income de—
~i~ed~ from abroad, which can be measured in money....2
Continuing, he argues that ~eoonomic welfare of a conniunity consists in
the balance of satisfactions derived from the use of the national dividend
3
over the dissatisfactions involved in the making of it.”
At this point, it may be discerned that specific standards or criteria
are expected and desirable for economic welfare. It may now be said that
competition is desirable because such a market situation makes possible the
realization of the following economic welfare criteria: (1) that there be
full employment, all persons willing and able and seeking employment can
fInd the type of’ job sought as regards qualifications, trades, professions
and training; (2) that security is not only for the whole community but
for the individual also; (3) that production should be highest possible
and most efficient; (4) that there should be an equitable distribution of
C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London, 1929), p. 11.
2lbid., p. 31.
3lbid., pp. 86—87.
ii I ~I ~ •~ lI~hI~i!!. ~_Lh~I~I~
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income among the factors of production; (5) that all forms of resources,
natural and financial, should be utilized to the maximum; (6) that there
should be progress in the system in order for it to expand end grow quanti-.
tatively and qualitatively; (7) that there should be price stability.
The question now arises as to how our goals are affected by any novel
economic developments oontrary to the competitive system. The most non
conforming element appe aring in the system is the monopoly.
Monopoly
There is no doubt that when the condition which exists presente:a
single control over all the supply of a product, thus permitting the re
lease of the.supply at such a rate as will yield the most profitable price,
a monopoly exists. Monopoly may be described as,
A situation in ~vthioh one or more buyers or.sellers can control
a sufficient portion of the supply or demand of an article to
permit them to exert a substantial influence over the price of that
article in the market. Most markets are affected by degrees and
elements of monopoly. A seller’s monopoly exists when a small number
of sellers c~ntrol a substantial proportion of the supply of a good
in a market.
Monopolies have advantages and disadvantages with. respect to the general
welfare. Take, for example, monopoly of city transportation, water systems,
street facilities, lighting and heating facilities, telephone and telegraph,
railroads, and other quasi—public industries. These monopolies are accept
able because of inherent waste in duplication of facilities, confusion in
rates, transferability of services and equipment (in railroads — rolling
stock) and other inconveniences associated with nonuniformity. They are
acceptable again because they are “quasi-public,” that is, the governments,
‘Horton, Ripley and Schnapper, ~p. cit., p. 227.
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local end national, determine policies to regulate operations and set
rates of charges to the oonsi.miers or users of those facilities. Examples
of some organizations that regulate on the national level are, the Inter
state Commerce Commission which regulates all rail and highway trans
portt~tion, the Civil Aeronautics Board which regulates all air travel and
transportation, Federal Communication Commission, which regulates all air
networks and broadcasting systems. Under the local government organization,
state, the Public Service Commission is an example. Cities have their
various rates and regulations. The post office is a clear example of govern
ment monopoly. Constitutional.provis ions grant the national government
other powers of monopoly,as the coinage of unoney.
Such a monopoly is an advantage to the general welfare because it
serves the economy best by elimination of the waste of duplications, in
convenieix~es, and hazards. It makes possible a unifonn program of national
defense.
1
The existence of a single monopoly is believed quite remote yet may
be of good service to the community if it does exist. An example, the
general store, with its basic goods.and supplies is located at the cross
roads of some communities in early .Amerioan life. With no other store nearby,
the owner certainly has a monopoly. The satisfaction derived from trading
with him would probably be equal to his price, upon considering traveling
many miles to another store which because of its location may be equally as
high in price. It might be noted that in chosing to buy elsewhere the
consumer deprives one monopoly of a profit and makes possible a profit to
another (who does not, depending upon the circumstances have to be a
1Edward H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cam
bridge, 1950), p. 3.
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monopolist). In any case, the general store monopolist is one because of
the location and inconvenience of travel and communication, the lack of
other stores, and the preference of the consumer (assuming some may abstain
from store bought goods such as gunpowder, bullets, and other items due to
the availability of substitutes like bow and arrows, slings, and other non-
fire weapons). In other words, if there are no substitutes and the consumer
preference exists, the monopolist can dictate his prices but only so long
as the buyers are willing to pay them.
This brings us to Piero Sraffa’s disposition on the ultimate strength
of monopoly. Sraff a argues that
The majority of the circumstances which affect the strength
of a monopolist (such as the possession of unique natural resources,
legal privileges, the control of a greater or less proportion of the
total production, the existence of rival commodities, etc.) exercise
their influence essentially by affecting the elasticity of the
demand for the monopolised goods. lJVhatever the causes may be, this
is the only decisive factor in estimating the degree of independence
which a monopolist has in fixing prices: the less elastic the demand
for his product the greater is his hold on his market. ‘Absolute
monopoly’ is that in which the elasticity of the demand for the
products of a firm is equal to unity (1): in that case, however much
the monopolist raises his prices, the sums periodically expended in
purchasing his goods are not even partially diverted into different
channels of expenditures, aiid his price policy, will not be affected
at all by the fear of competition from other sources of supply. So
soon as this elasticity increases, competition begins to make itself
felt, and becomes even more intense as the elasticity grows until
we get infinite elasticity in the demand for the products of an in
dividual undertaking, a state of perfect competition corresponds?-.
To clarify this statement by Sraffa, a brief examination of elasticity
is in order. Elasticity may be defined as “the percentage change in the
quantity (demanded or supplied) which would result from a one per cent change
1Piero Sraffa, “The Laws of Return under Competitive Conditions,”
Economic Journal, Xxxvi (December, 1926), pp. 542—43.
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price.” •For example, the elasticity of supply of a given product is 3.5;
that means that a one per cent increase in the price will eventually result
in a 3.5 per cent increase in the quantity supplied. Taken another way, the
elastioity demand for a product is —0.5; that means that a one per cent
increase in price will result in a 0.5 of one per cent decrease in quantity
demanded. The first reference to elasticity cited in Sraffa’s comments,
“the less elastic the demand for his product the greater is his hold on his
2
market,” suggests a case of inelastic demand. In such a case, moving from
relatively inelastic demand (a demand in v~ioh a given change in price
produces a less than proportionate change in quantity) to perfectly in
elastic demand (a demand in which a change in price produces no change in
quantity) the monopolist has a great hold on his market. No matter which
direction his price goes, the quantity demanded is relatively unresponsive.
The second reference, “absolute monopoly is that in which the elasticity of
the demand...is equal to unity,” suggests that a state of unit elasticity
of demand exists and in such a case a given change in price results in an
equal proportionate change in the quantity. If the price doubles, the
quantity demand will half. The third reference, “so soon as this elasticity
increases, competition begins to make itself felt, and becomes even more
intense as the elasticity grows until we get infinite elastioity...a state
4
of perfect competition corresponds.” This suggests a case of perfect
1Kenneth E. Boulding, Economic Analysis (New York and London,l941), p. 131.





elasticity - one in which an infinitesimally small change in price will
cause an infinitely large thange in the quantity demanded or supplied.
Such a situation suggests perfect competition.
The ix~dications are that at certain prices the monopolist is able to
command his market relatively to the demand for his products. By adjusting
his price, he is able to feel the pulse of the demand for his products and
may thereby decide upon a price to maintain. If he appears to make at
tractive profits, others may decide to enter his market and rivalry sets
in. It is then a matter of continuing adjustments of price until all mono
poly profits have been absorbed, not by one but by many, producers; thus a
state of perfect competition arises. The availability of substitutes has
its significance in that it affords consumers a range from which to select.
The monopolist would consider this in his price policy. Substitutes, at
attractive prices, would draw consumers from the monopolists to other
producers, which again would affect the demand curve of the monopolist and
tempt price adjustments.
Changes in consumers’ tastes would be significant to the degree in
which they no longer obtained satisfaction from the monopolis~ts goods. In
such a situation, regardless of the price the monopolist offered, there
would be no takers due to the inability of his goods to render a satisfaction;
consequently, he would cease to produce.
Looking at the marginal analysis of a competitive firm, as compared
with a monopolistic firm,will afford some enlightenment on the matter of
price policies. According to Alt and Bradford, “the demand curve presents
1Ibid.
j!!~!!!I!:~I,!I!,~ti~d ~ .;.!~! .
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the schedule of prices at which the firm can sell different quantities on
the market; it is the curve of average revenue (total dollar sales i number
o f units sold). The corresponding cost curve indicates the ave rage cos t
of producing a. unit of product. Both demand and cost can be stated al
ternatively as marginal schedules or curves. When the curves are thus
presented, they indicate the effect on total revenue and cost of selling
1








Fig. 1. Equation of Marginal Revenue and
Marginal Cost by a Business Firm
From such an analysis, a producer can decide the output best produced
and sold. Such an output would be where the marginal revenue equals
marginal cost. Any production beyond this point indicates that the last
units add more to to tal cost than they add to total revenue • Production
short of this point indicates that some expansion of production would then
add more to total revenue than total cost.
A
Richard M. Alt and William C. Bradford, Business Economics (Homewood,
1953), p. 232.
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The monopolist, by definition, has sole control of a supply for which
there is no close substitute. Any output which he places on the market
will have a major effect on the price. H~Ls demand curve is identified with
the market demand curve. Therefore he ha~ two choices: (1) he can control
the amount of output which he places on t ie market, and (2) he can set his
price for his goods. This is so because ~iis demand curve is less than per-.
fectly elastió. This is not true under c mpetitiozi. The competitive
producer must accept the market price as is. His demand curve is perfectly
elastic, and his marginal revenue curve is his average revenue curve. The
oompetiti~e producer’s only alternative i to regulate the amount of his
output, which because of the relatively s iall amount involved cannot affect
1




Fig. 2. Equilibrium of Firm Under
Pure Competition
For both producers the~ point where iiarginal costs are equal to
marginal revenue is the most advantageou~ point in output. The fact that
the monopolist has a negatively inclined demand curve maans that his




illustrated in Figure 1 (AB is less than AE). Selling at price AE gives
a return that not only covers cost of OA output, but affords excess profits
of the area CEFG. The monopolist can enjoy these profits only so long as
there is a demand for his goods. This point will be considered further in
the chapter on performanOe.
The development of the ~nierican economy has brought many forms of.
business enterprises and many varied industries. The extent of development
ranges from joint corporations to the small entrepreneur, depending upon
the nature of the industries and the relative costs of capital outlay. The
nearest to the single firm monopoly is, theoretically duopoly, but economic
reality appears to deny this, that is, any duopoly existing of significant
influence. The greatest influence seems to be in our basic industries,
which appear to be characterized by a few powerful producers. Their opera
tions and actions from time to time have led other components of the economy
to grave concern. In fa.ot, they are often held to be monopolistic. Edward
Mason comments, “both as an analytical problem arid as a problem in public
polloy, monopoly means typically oligopoly with or without product differen
1
tiation.”
Industries in which a few large firms account for the major portion
of output are said to be oligopolistic. Oligopolistio industries are in
character monopolistic. It is assumed that members of the oligopoly may act
as one. Each producer is large and a powerfol influence on the market.
Should he reduce his price, his competitors would be forced to follow. If
1Edward S. Mason, “Various Views on the Monopoly Problem,” The Review
of Economics and Statistics, XXXI (May, 1949), 104.
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the industry demand schedule is inelastic in direction of a price decrease,
any price reduction below the monopoly prioc would in effect reduce the net
re’~enue of the oligopolistic producer. Likewise, should one of the large
producers set a higher price to yield higher profits, the others will
follow and also gain higher revenue. Thus price competition becomes futile
as a method of obtaining additional business. Finally, therefore, the
prices are fixed as though by a single seller at a point that maxiiiizes pro
fits for the joint membership of the oligopoly. The following are circum
stances necessary for businessmen to act in this manner. Judgenient of the
market must coincide amoi~ members of the oligopoly; each seller must reach
a verdict about price that is reached by the others; •each must be satisfied
with his share. Every seller in the oligopoly whether a higher—or-lower
cQst producer, new or old, would have to view his self-interest in conformity
with the group. There must be no divergences among the producers great
enough to tempt an aggressive member to get more business by making his
own terms. There must be no undercutting openly or secretly, and when one
makes a price change the others must promptly go along.
Under the above conditions, the products must be practically uniform~
Price shading or quality improvement by one must be common to the oligopoly
group in order to maintain the respective market shares. The commodity
should have substantial immunity from substitution. Each n~mber of the
oligopoly must know in general.what is being done by the others. Among the
buyers, none may be so powerful that he can play off one seller against
another to force competitive ~rioe concessions within the industry. Unless
the conditions of formal oligopoly are met, uniformity of action is less
likely and soaroity of sellers - even big ones - may not be taken for granted
1 d]kft ~
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as a barrier to market competition.
T~ place of monopoly or giant businesses,who are Hkely to have mono—
polistlo character, in the economy can be understood only if they are con—
sidered in relation to other segments of the economic structure.
.1 ~ ~
CHAPTER III
THE EFFECT OF CONCENTRATION OF FIRMS ON EMPLOYMENT,
OUTPUT, ~ND INCOME
Concentration implies the power of a few large enterprises to direct
the coarse of business activity because of their dominant position in the
market, resulting from their share of the nation’s economic resources. -
Employment, output,and income have been chosen as criteria for measuring
concentration. There are other oriteria,suoh as assets or sales,which could
be used. Should all applicable cross influences be exsmined,the presentation
and results would be awkward. Therefore, it is necessary to consider
separately various measures of concentration, at the risk of some consequent
distortion. The distribution of gainful employment is examined first.
Part I - Employment
Distribution of Gainful Employment
Approximately sixty million Americans were employed in the production
and distribution of the national economic output in 1950. “The business
sector accounts for 69 per cent of the gainfully employed, the non-business
sector 31. Non—business employment is to be found in agriculture, forestry,
and fisheries (nearly 12 per cent); government (o~ver 12 per cent); the pro
fessions (3.4 per cent); and a comparable percentage in households and
non-profit organizations. In the business sector, about half of the forty
million gainfully employed are in mining, manufaoturing,and construction.
The other half are engaged in distribution and the service lines (including
1The term employment is used here to embrace all persons working for




finance and the public utilities).”1
The business sector is the main interest; it has 69 per cent of the
gainfully employed and areas wherein big business predominates.
The Size Distribution
“The nearly four million business firms operating in the United States
in 1948 varied in size from proprietorships that hired no employees to
corporations with payrolls of more than 100,000 employees. If for present
purposes a business is considered to be big when it hires 1,000 or more
employees, there were altogether 3,100 big firms — less than one—tenth of
one per cent of the total number. ‘Basing size on number of employees, the
business population is distributed as follows:2
TABLE 1
BUSINESS POPULATION, SIZE BASED ON NUMBER OF EMPLO~EES
Number of Firms Per CentEmployees (in thousands) of Total
0 — 19 3,771.1 95.1
20 — 99 160.7 4.0
100 .499 28.7 0.7
500 -999 3.3 0.1
1,000 or more 3.1 0.1
Totals 3,966.8 100.0
D. II. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
2.
Ibid., p. 64.
U 1 ~I&IU UNSi.Ih~all,IU
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The 3,100 big firms accounted for one—third of all business employment.




DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS EMPLOYMENT, SIZE BASED ON
NIThIBER OF EMPLOYEES
Employees Employment Per Cent
• (in thousands) of Total
1 — 19 8,445 20.2
20 — 99 6,257 15.0
100 —499 5,712 13.7
500 —999 2,287 5.5




Kaplan points out that, “manufacturing, which alone accounts for one-
fourth of the national employment, is the field in which most big business
is to be found. Over half - or 1,800 of the 3,100 firms that qualif~r as
big — are in manufacturing. Transportation, communications, and public
utilities account for 400, and retail trade for 300. In manufacturing, one
firm in every 183 hires 1,000 or more employees • In mining, the big enter




firms. Almost half of all firms in business are in retailing, where the
firms outnumber those of manufacturing nearly six to one. In this sector,
big firms are only one in 5,68l.”~
The distribution of employment by type of organization affords further
2
identification of the place of big business. The Survey of Current Business
shows the following size distribution for incorporated and unincorporated
enterprises (in thousands):
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY TYPE OF ORGABIZATION
Size of Firm Corporation Per Cent Unincorporated Per Cent
of Total Enterprise of Total
0 — 3 Employees 109.2 2.8 2,747.1 71.5
4 —19 Employees 194.3 5.1 597.6 15.6.
20 or more 108.1 2.8 83.5 2.2
Total 411.7 10.7 3,428.2 89.3
The incorporated sector, wi~re big enterprise is characteristically
found, represents only 411.7 thousand finns compared with about 3.4 million
unincorporated enterprises. They comprise 10.7 per cent of all business
firms, but they represent the majority of firms with more than twenty em
ployees. Yet most corporations, like the proprietorships, are quite small,
housing less than twenty employees.
1lbid., p. 66.
2U. S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (~Vashington,
1951), p. 11.
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The above groupings of business firms is useful in showing the range
of outlets for individual enterprises; it is not, however, an adequate
basis for measuring the concentration of control over employment opportuni
ties in the economy.
The Business Giants
“Among the 3,100 firms listed as having 1,000 or more employees in
1948 were 260 corporations each employing upwards of 10,000. They were dis
tributed among the various industries as follows:
T.ABIE4
DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AMONG FIRMS BAyING
1,000 OR MORE EMPLOYEES
Manufacturing 163
Transportation, communication








These corporate communities accounted for eight million employees, or
22 per cent of business employment. The 163 giants in manufactures accounted
for nearly five million employees; 54 firms in public utilities had over 2
mil1ion~ employees; retail trade with 26 giant firms had 84O,OOO.~1
‘The figures for firms of 10,000 and over are as of December 31, 1948.
See M. A. Adelman, “The Measurement of Industrial Concentration,” Review of
Economic and Statistics (November, 1951), p. 275, quoted in A. D. Kaplan,
op. cit., p. 68.
~[~l I~J~ lthHIL~k A4U*A~IkII~
24
Such disparity between firms and emp1oyn~ezzt helps to identif~r the area
of study by giving us a sense of the relative numerical dependence of the
gainfully employed upon the larger business units.
Trend in Size of Firms
Going back to l939,we find that the line between large end small business
es is drawn at 500 employees as in the following table. There were 4,900 of
the larger size in operation in 1939, representing 0.15 per cent of the total
business firms. In 1948 we find that the number in the upper size c~tegory
has grown to 6,400, and they represent 0.16 per cent of the total. (See
Table 5).
It is observed that the Departmsnt of Commerce has noted there is no
evidence that the relative positions of the smaller and larger firms have
changed significantly between the immediate prewar and the postwar periods.
The tentative conclusion, based on the limited data available, was:
tween September 1940 and March 1948 it would appear that enployment ~nong
firms with 1,000 or more workers rose by 41 per cent, in contrast to a rise
of 24 per cent in total employment covered by the business population. The
number of firms in operation in this category rose by about 25 per cent, or
somewhat more then the 19 per cent over—all advance in the business population.
However, concentration as measured by a Lorenz curve - whidi takes into
account the complete size distribution of firms and employment - does not
show any marked increase for industry generally over this period.tt’
Other evidence that may be had for earlier years would likewise suggest
that the distribution of employees by size of business had not radically
1U. S. Departnmnt of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (Washington,
1950), p. i~.
IL~ 1 ~ ~ ~
TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF ALL BUSINESS FIRMS BY ND1~BER OF EMPLO!EESa
1939 1948
. Th~mber Per Cent Number Per Cent
(In thousands) of Total (In thousands) of Total
Number of Firms:
0 — 499 employees 3,311.8 99.85 3,960.4 99.84
500 and over 4.9 0.15 6.4 0.16
Totals 3,316.7 100.00 3,966.8 100.00
Employment
Firms with 0 - 499
employees
Paid employees 12,456 59.30 19,273 60.54
Proprietors 4,281 5,334
Finns with 500 and b
over 11,489 40.70 16,036 39.46
Totals 28,226 100.00 40,643 100.00
acomputed from U.S. Department of Connuerce, Survey of Current Business (May
1954), Tables 4, 5, pp. 12—13; the same (May 1950), Tables 7, 8, pp. 19—20;
the same, National Iflo~ne Supplement, 1951, Tables 24, 27, pp. 180—81; 186—
87.





changed over the past four decades. The use of data from the censuses of
manufacturers which was taken by establishment rather than by firms should
bear this oixb.
T.ABLE 6
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL WAGE EARNERS IN SMALL AND
LARGE M1U~UFACTTJRING ESTABLISm~ENrSa
Smallest 75 Per Cent Next 20 Per Cent Largest 5 Per Cent
Year of Establishments of Establishments of Establishments
1914 13.2 31.6 55.3
1929 10.5 29.7 59.8
1939 11.5 30.7 57.9
1947 11.3 26.4 62.3
aU. S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (March 1944), Table
5, p. n.l
We find the smallest 75 per cent of the manufacturing establishments
accounted for about 13.2 per cent of the total wage earners in manufacturing
in 1914; 33 years later the corresponding portion of total establishments
accounted for 11.3 per cent of the mizh higher number of wage earners. Over
the same period of time the proportion of wage earners employed by the largest
5 per cent of the establishment went up snd down, and by 1947 - under the
stimulation of the war to an enlarged scale of production — it was moderately
higher than for the earlier periods.
1U. S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (Washington,
1944), p. 11.
1 h ~ ~
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Trend in Number of Business Firms
In as much as only a fraction of one per cent (.15) of business firms
is in the big business class, the long-term trend in total number of business
es serves as an index of the trend in the small business population and an
indication of the ease or difficulty of new business entry.
Comprehensive estimates made by the United States Department of Com
merce, show a net rise in the number of business firms of about 850,000 over
the period 1929-49 - an increase slightly greater proportionately than the
corresponding increase in the business population:
TABLE 7
GROVVTH IN NUMBER OF BUSINESS FIRMS TO GROWTH IN
BUSINESS POPULATION
Annual Average United States Number of Firms
Year Number of Firm? Population2 Per Thousand
• (In thousands) (In millions) Population
1929 3,097.1 122.8 25
1939 3,303.6 131.7 23
1949 3,964.8 150.7 26
It was oonoluded from available data, data prior to 1929 being incomplete:
~ may reasonably be inferred, therefore, that the ratio between number of
1National Industrial Conference Board, Economic Almanac 1951—52 (1951),
pp. 222-23. Population figures are for census years 1930, 1940, 1950, respec
tively. During World War II the number of conoerns fell to a low point of
2.9 millions in December 1943 because of the draft and shortage of materials.
The rebound after the war brought ratios back to the long—term trend by the
middle of 1946. A. 13. H. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 71.
2Th1d.
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firms and total population was perhaps as great as the outbreak of World War
II as at any other time since 1900. This suggosts,at least in terms of numbers,
that the opportunities for individual enterprise had not declined perceptibly
and that the eutrepreneu~i~l class was at least as numerous in 1941, relatively
1
as in 1900 or 1929.”
It may be said, from the examination of the over-all employment and
business population statistics of recent years, that the status of the giant
firm has grown with the economy but has had no measurable effect on the dis
tribution of total economic opportunity as measured by employment. It
• appears that big business represents a minor fraction of the whole area of
economic outlets, and accounts for the major portion of employment in certain
industries. Its growth seems to have been matched by the growth of the
economy as a whole with no significant alteration of its place in the whole
context over the past quarter century.





In Part I, it was shown that a substantial proportion of business
employment is concantrated in a relatively small number of large firms. It
seems reasonable that there should be a similar concentration of output.
The patterns of concentration of output are of interest for their influence
on the scope allowed for competition. The degree of cempetition in a
market in our present economy of differentiated and patented products de—
pends upon the range of substitutes or alternatives available to oompeting
buyers and sellers. “Concentration of production is generally inimical to
1
competition if it limits the choices of buyers or the offerings of sellers.”
The meaningful measures of concentration for this part of the study are
those that reveal the number of competitive sellers in a given market.
The area of manufacturing affords comprehensive information in suf
ficient detail to permit an appraisal. Moreover, it has been recognized
as the sector of the economy that moat clearly reflects in its organization
the impact of large—scale production in the competitive system. For these
two reasons, manufacturing is the center of attention.
Although manufacturing is selected for examination, this should not
minimize the problem of business concentration in large—scale enterprises
outside of manufacturers. Kaplan points out that
...the rise of large chain and department store operations is
a significant factor in current distribution of consumer goods,
accounting for more than a fifth of the retail sales in 1948.
Moreover, there are varying degrees of concentration within
1A. D. Kaplan, ç~p. cit., p. 74.
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the chain area itself. Taken together; however, the big business
sector in retail does not have the high share in distribution
that sc~ne of the giants of manufacturing have in their respective
industries. Moreover, manufactures generally, exclusive of mining
and crude petroleum production, originate a large scale of the
national income than do the distributive industries and the public
utilities combined.’
In support of this Kaplan cites, “As of. 1950, national incane originated
in manufacturing was $75 billion; in retail distribution, $31 billion;
wholesale trade, *12.4 billion; transportation, canmunications, and public
utilities, *20.5 billion; services, $22.3 billion; mining, quarrying, crude
2
petroleum and natural gas, $5.2 billion.”
Ccxnoentration in Large Plants
The Census of Manufacturers for 1947 reflects notable advances over
previous decades in total number of plants and in average scale of plant
operation. The last prewar census (1939) listed 173,802 establishmen1~with
aggregate value added by manufacture of $24.5 billion. Value added by
manufacture in 1947, reflecting the position after World War II shows an
increase in establishments of 240,881, with a total value added of *74.4
billion. Reduced to constant dollars that would represent an increase in
the nation’s output of manufactured products of approximately 75 per cent
for 1947 over 1939. This is a marked increase in average plant output.
Further light,as thrown on the oontrasting patterns in the structure of





Kaplan’s study reveals that by scale of operation the 452 iuanufactur—
ing industries classified in the 1947 census fall conveniently into three
broad categories. One—fourth consisted entirely of small—scale operations
at the plant level, not a single plant housing as many as 500 employees.
About half of the total was in a middle group, whore each industry had one
or more big plants, but where the manor portion of the industry output was
produced in small plants. In the remaining quarter were industries in
which more than half the output and employment was in plants with 500 or
more employees.
If plants are accepted. as large-scale when they employ 1,000 persons~
or more, in .1947 there wore 30 industries in which two—thirds or more of
the output cane from plants at least that size. At the top were six in
dustries in which more than iwo-thirds of the outptrt came from plants with
more than 2,500 employees: aircraft, aircraft engines, tractors, stool
works and rolling mills, locomotives and parts, and small arms ammunition.
At the other end of the listing, plants of less than 50 employees accounted
for 100 per cent of the production of sand—lime produots~, 90 per cent of
fur goods, 86 per cent of pouring mixtures and blocks, 83 per cent of
natural cheese, 81 per cent of manufactured ices 79 per cent of women’s
2
shirts,~ and 79 per cent of concrete products.
Another significant observation on concentration of output is that of
plant size as related to industry growth. Though the average size of plants





bigger manufacturing plants is uniform. The inoreased scale of plant
operation in certain growth industries may be associated with their develop
ment thrc~gh time. Innovations with high expectancy may engage any number
of entrants with varying degrees of financial resources and know-how, through
a period of trial and error. Of the many who enter into experimentation
only a few usually survive; the less resourceful ones are eliminated. Out
put is then concentrated in fewer and larger mass-production units, run by
the successful survivors. Kaplan states that, “In expanding industries such
as motor vehicles, washing machine, aircraft, and asbestos products, the
increase in the average size of plant between the census of 1914 end 1937
1
was greater then 300 per cent.”
It is noted in TNEC Monograph 27 that in certain active industries,
in the same period, there was a decline of more than 50 per cent in the
average size of plant. Some of these are condensed and evaporated milic,
2
corsets and allied garments, window shades, and manufactured ice.
It also appears that the decline in size of plants often accompanies
expansion of the industry- as a whole. This is observed from a continuous
study of 204 industries for the period 1914 to 1937. In 63 of these in
dustries the average size of plant declined, while in 22 of the 63 both the
number of plants end the number of wage earners increased. Yet in another
22, there were decreases in both plants and wage earners. In the remaining
19, the number of plants increased but employment decreased. The expansion of
employment and output in four large—scale industries — motor vehicles, iron
‘Ibid.
2Temporary- National Economic Committee, The Structure of Industry,
Monograph 27 (1941), pp. 82—83.
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arid steel, electrical machinery end chemicals might well be a paramount
factor in the over—all increase in plant size. Between 1914 and 1937, these
industries trebled their employment. This growth accounted for one-third
1
of the rise in the average size of plant during that period. Further ox
emplificatidn of the wide range in the scale of operations among manufactur
ing industries will be given.
Plant Size Distribution ~Among Large Industries
The U. S. Bureau of Census, Census of Manufacturers 1947, lists twelve
leading manufacturing iniustrios for 1947 by total employment or value
added. (See Table 8). The first eight are ranked so by both measures;
footwear arid meatpacking appears only on the list ranked by largest employ
ment, petroleum refining and paper and board mills are only on the list of
ten highest by value added. These twelve industries together accounted for
2
about a fourth of all manufacturing employment and output. It is apparent
that at the pole of small scale, in sawmills and planing mills, employees
averaged 20 per establishment; whereas, at the opposite pole, the average
for the steel industry was 2,329 employees per establishment. The statistics
further indicate that while the sawmills and planing mills industry required
over 19,000 establishments to build up a total value—added of *1.5 billion —
*78,000 per establishment - the steel industry accounted for more than two
and one-fourth billion with only 215 establishments - ‘~l0.5 million per
establishment.
1lbid., p. 16.
2Kaplan, op. cit., p. 78.
TABLE 8
a*RANKING OF TWELVE LEADING MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1947 BY TOTAL EMPLO’fMENT OR VALUE ADDED
Employees Value Added
Industr~r Number Employees Value Added Per~ Rank Number Rank Amount of Estab- Per Estab- Establishment
(In millions) liabments. iishei~nt (In thousands)
Motor vehicles and Parts 1 653,169 1 $3,577.4 963 678 $3,715
Steel works and rolling
mills 2 500,799 2 2,275.7 215 2,329 10,585
Sawmills and Planing Mills
~ general 3 382,902 6 1,491.1 19,223 20 78
~ Cotton — broad—woven fabrics 4 357,361 4 1,562.3 602 594 2,595
Petroleum refining b (145,806) 5 1,494.5 437 334 3,420
Newspapers and Periodicals 5 303,198 3 2,063.4 10,505 29 196
Men’s suits, coats,
trousers° 6 269,170 10 1,039.0 3,793 71 274
Women’s dresses~ suits,
coats, skirtsa 7 264,604 7 1,239.3 8,089 33 153
Bread and other bakery
products 8 233,310 8 1,100.8 6,797 34 162
Footwear, except rubber 9 229,303 (746.0) 1,288 174 579
Meatpacking, wholesale 10 208,369 (977.0) 2,153 97 454
Paper and board mills (148,080) 9 1,050.1 665 223 1,579
aU.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1947.
~ industry classifications: 2711—Newspaper; and 2721 Periodicals.
°Combines industry classifications: 23ll—Men’á and BOys’ suits and coats; 2329—Men’s and Boys’ clothing,
N.C.C.; and 2327—Separate trousers.
dCombines industry classifications: 2333—Dresses, unitpprice; 2334—Dress, dozen price; 2335-Women’s suits
and coats; 2336—Women’s skirts.
*R.eproducedin A. D. H. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 79.
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It is also found among this ranking that in six of the twelve largest
industries, the average number of employees per establishment is under 100;
in fbur it was under 36; and in none of these did value added, average as
much as half a million dollars per unit. Five industries were operated in
plants that averaged more than 200 employees and exceeded ~l.5 million in
value added. According to the ranking of our largest industries, it seems
that while the scale of plant operations appears to have increased in
manufacturers as a whole, about half of our largest industries are still
essentially industries of small—scale plant operation.
The indications are that the scale of operations tends to be determined
by technological requirements and that recently there has be en no dis tmet
general trend toward increasing plant concentration. Often the nature of
operations requires large establishments, as in the steel industry, where
~l0O million may be inadequate for a modern mill. The basic requirenents
that are so costly are blast furnaces and other fixed costs. The belief pre
vails as Kaplan points out that
...the efficiency of size is primarily in the scale of plant
operation and that beyond the plant development concentration
of output in a company reflects the waxing of market power
rather than greater efficiency. It is not the single large
establishment that arouses coneern. The fear of big business
conoentration and market leadership is centered on multiplant
companies with vast aggregate assets, sales volume, and pay
rolls, with a number of physically separated plants consolidated
under central management.1
In order to estimate the trend in the size of firm,Kaplan presents a
2
distribution of the twelve largest industries by size of firm. Here he
points out that: (1) small finns almost entirely constitute several of the
‘Ibid., pp. 79-82.
2See supra, p. 34.
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largest industries; (2) sawmills and planning mills industry, comprising
18,000 companies each with fewer than 500 employees, accounts for 80 per cent
of the industry’s output; (3) over half of the production in firms of less
than 100 employees is in women’s apparel industries; (4) company concentration
and establishment concentration are highly ranked in steel works and rolling
mills and motor vehicles and parts; (5) more than 73 per cent of value added
in motor vehicles and parts is accounted for by firms with 10,000 employees
or more; (6) in steel works and rolling mills, 77 per cent of output measured
by value added was produced by 24 companies; (7) both steel and motor
vehicles are produced largely in establishmen±s of 2,500 employees or more,
which account for about two-thirds of value added; (8) in the meat packing
industry, as contrasted with the steel industries, there are a few outstand-
giants and much more numerous single establishment firms; (9) about 41 per
cent of value added however, is accounted for by the Big Four which consists
of nearly 100 establishments; (10) there are less than 1,800 firms — 200 fewer
than in meat packing, in the men’s clothing industry but the five top cloth
1
ing manufacturers account for only 8 per cent of the output.
From the distribution just examined, it appears that the concentration
ratio tends to be high where capital requirements are high and that, where
business can be operated with little capital, the concentration ratio is low.
Concentration of Output by Products
Concentration of output in industry groups are indicative of the
variety in the business structure, but do not disclose the degree of com
petition or monopoly. This is so because industry groups often embrace
1). H. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 82—83.
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products not in real competition with one another, and often products in
direct competition with one another are often in different industry group
ings. Illustrative of this are products made of synthetic and natural fibers.
Some of the synthetic fibers are derived from wood, coal, petroleum,or
glass; consequently, they do not compete with cotton, wool, or skins until
they enter the processing stage in the textile industry. Plastics and other
types of non—metallic products crisscross töi industry lines of metals, while
every metal competes with other metals and alloys.
Distribution of.Produots byConoentration Ratios
Concentration ratios are computed according to the percentage of output
accounted for by the four largest (or eight or twenty largest) producers of
the product in relation to the total. By this method a study of product
concentration was made for the TNEC investigation, using 1,80? product
1
groups from the 1937 Census of Manufacturers. It was revealed that four
firms or less produced 70 per cent or more of the output in more than one-
half of the 1,800 product.groups analyzed. (See Table 9). Looking at the
concentration according to value of products, we find slightly more than
half the products by aggregate value have concentration ratios less than 60
per cent. On this difference between the results by number of products and
the results by value of products Kaplan comments that it “...points up the
fact that the products in some cases are relatively insignificant in the total
output of either the firms or the industry producing them, while other
products may be major items both for the firm and for the industry.”. Among
1Tempoy National Economic Committee, op. cit., p. 275.
2Kaplan, op. cit., p. 81.
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the products of lesser value are many patented
tion ratio is inevitably high. Apart from the
particular products within industries and in ~
groupings are far from satisfactory in represe
which the product must compete. Most of the i
be too narrow to indioatethe real range of ~:
available to the buyer. Clair Wilcox gives t.
his TNEC study:
Goods are differentiated on the basi
which they are made, the process einploye
the extent of integration obtained in th
production is carried on. Rubber combs
combs, and furniture is treated as one p
when made of metal, and a third when mad
willow. Work shoes and dress shoes for:
and children are each divided into four,
the process of manufacture. Women’s hos
in the same plant is a different product
plant and finished in another.1
These examples are illustrative of the narrow
The real range of close substitutes that are
to be indicated by such classification.
Limitations of the Product Conoeia
In discussing the limitations of product
points out that: (1) the data on concentratio
amoung of product differentiation, substituta
competitive behavior; (2) monopolistic prioin
markets for numerous goods and services whose
1Olair Wilcox, “On the Alleged Ubiquity
Review (supplement, May, 1950), p. 69..
items in which the concentra
difference in importance of
alue of shipments, the product
ating range of the market on
-oduct classifications tend to
ose substitutes that are
~se examples on the basis of
of the materials from
in their fabrication, and
establishments whore
re separated from other
oduct when of wood, another
of fiber, cotton, seed or
en and for women, misses,
five and six categories by
ery knitted and finished
from that knitted in one
ass of product classification.
vailable to buyers is not likely
ration Data
concentration data, Kaplan
do not reveal a significant
~ility and competition and non-
and price inertia exists in
sellers are many and small,
f Oligopoly,” American Economic
~MiI~ii~ ~
TABlE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER ~ND VALUE OF PRODUCTS BY CONCENTRATION
RATIO ClASSES, 1937a1
Value of Products
Percentage of Number Curnula- mount Cumula
Output by Four of Per tive in Per tive
Largest Corn— Products Cent Per Cent Millions Cent Per Cent
panies
0.1—25 90 5.0 5.0 $3,436 11.7 11.7
25.1—50 335 15.5 23.5 9,140 30.9 42.6
50.1—60 183 10.1 33.6 2,655 9.0 51.6
60.1—70 230 12.7 46.3 2,733 9.3 60.9
70.1—80 259 14.4 60.7 3,491 13.2 74.1
50.1—100 382 21.1 81.8 5,214 17.7 91.8
Undisolosedb 328 18.2 100.0 2,414 8.2 100.0
aComputed from TNEC, the Structure of Industry, Monograph 27, p. 275.
of patented or otherwise controlled items in which concen






just as aggressive rivalry might occur among a few sellers; (3) a single
census by itself may fail to disclose the dynamics of growth, decline, of
innovatiln and obsolescenCe; (4) inventions or innovations protected by
patents or first-in—the-market positions of leading firms - as in farm
machinery, aluminum, processed cheese, electric lamps, nylon, rayon,diesel
locomotives, titanium - may decline continuously from a 100 per cent concen
tration at the start and yet a major fraction of output may be maintained
by the innovator.’ This suggest that any real product innovation brings
into being a new monopolist.
It is reasonable to say that the concentration of output of individual
products does give some indication of the market impact of large producers
in distinct, well—defined products like automobiles or gasoline. Yet suoh
measures for individual products are inadequate for revealing concentration
in finas that carry a multitude of related product lines. Attention is now
turned to the appraisal of the output of the largest corporations.
Concentration and Dfrersification in the Fifty Largest ~IIenufacturers
In 1937 the fifty largest manufacturing companies together employed
one sixth of the wage earners, contributed more than 20 per cent of the
value added, end accounted for one third of the total coat of materials,
fuels, andenergy employed in manufacturing. (See Table 10). Of the
category under examination,Kaplan comments, t1There was no industrial
category that was not represented within the fifty. Several of the companies
appeared in virtually everyone of the 15 major groups....Their aggregate
dollar output appeared almost equally di’~idod between the products in which
1Kaplan, op. cit., p. 89.
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they individually manufactured less then one-fourth of the national
output and products in which their share was above one-fourth. About 15
per cent of the aggregate value of production of the fi fty largest was con
centrated in products of which individual companies accounted for more than
1
half of the national output.” (See Table ii).
This suggests that the preserve of the fifty giants in individual product
lines is very important. Further, it is realized that each time a firm
introduces a new product, with or without patent protection, a new mono
polist is created. Yet such temporary product monopolies serve to increase
the range of consumer alternatives and provide a new challenge to establish
ed products. Therefore, the data are no more than another indication of the
complicated product structure that the big corporation represents and are
not decisive in evaluating the market power or import of the giant corporation.
The major question has been how the data on concentration of production
are related to the vitality of competitive effort. On the significant
elements in the structure of industrial production and its relation to market
structure, it may be noted: that concentration of output in large-scale enter
prise is characteristic of a substantial proportion of total manufacturing
production. At the same time, a number of the most important industries
are found to be small—scale operations. The increase in business scale —
at the level of the plant is not necessarily or even typically a function
of increasing specialization. It has, in fact, been accompanied by a greater
variety in the output of the firm and an increase in the number of markets
where competition has to be met. As a consequence, the ratios of total
production ascribed to the four or eight leading finns of an industry prove
unrealistic for gaugi~ng the vigor of the competition faced in actual markets.
‘Ibid., p. 91
TABLE 10
PRODUCTION OF THE LARGEST FIFTY MANUFACTURING
COMPANIES, 1937*
Au Largest 50 ?oroentage of
Measures of Importance Manufacturing Companies all Menu
, facturing
Number of concerns 146,720 50 0.03
Number of establishments 166,794 2,86~ 1.7
Wage earners:
Average number for year 8,569,231 1,390,503 16.2
Wa~s paid (in thousands) 10,112,883 2,155,038 21.3
Salaried employees:
Average number for the year 1,217,171 189,354 15.6
Salaries paid (in thousands) 2,716,866 425,939 15.7
Value of Products (in thou
sands) 60,712,872 16,805,135 27.7
Cost of materials, fuels
Energy, etc. (in thousands) 35,539,233 11,719,824 33•0
Value added by manufacture
(in thousands) 25,173,539 5,085,309 20.2
*T~en from Temporary National Economic Committee, The Structure of
Industry, Monograph 27, p. 583.
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TABLE 11
DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTS MI~.NtJFACTURED BY THE lARGEST FIFTY
COMPANIES, 1937*
(By concentration clessesa)
Share of the Individual Value of Products Number of Products
Company in National Total Cumulative Total Cumulative
Output (In thousands) Per Cent Per Cent
Total ~l6,805,l35 —— 4,086 --
Less than 5 per cent 1,052,671 6.3 1,758 43.0
5.1 to 25.0 per cent 7,642,118 51.7 1,460 78.8
25.1 to 50.0 per cent 5,559,060 84.7 545 92.2
50.1 to 75.0 per cent 1,726,935 95.0 175 96.5
75.1 to 100.00 per cent 824,351 100.0 147 100.0
*T~en from Temporary National Economic Committee, The Structure of
Industry, Monograph 27, p. 616.
51n this table each company’s percentage of the national output is
given for each product. The aggregates are therefore gross figures -
if five of the companies produce the same product, it would be represented




Another area of the statistics of concentration will now be examined,
namely, the distribution of the national product and income.
PART III
Income
J~nother significant factor in the identification of economic power
is the comparative financial position of the large corporations. In re
lation to the income and financial resources of the remainder of the economy,
the income and resources of large industrial corporations are very im
pressive. It was stated in a recent Federal Trade Commission report that,
“although they are not significant from the point of view of control over
indi~idual markets, the figures are n~aningful in that they portray the
extent to which the industrial economy as a whole is dominated by the over
1
all economic power of a small number of giant corporations.”
In the following pages, an attempt will be made to examine the finan
cial resources and earning power of big business and relate them to the
corresponding record for the whole economy — the national income. To begin
with, the sectors (corporate, and non-corporate) will be differentiated..
This is done because it is believed that it is the expanding wealth of
corporations as a group that has served as prima facie evidence of concen
tration. The main attention will be focused on the corporate sector because
systematic financial data are limited to what is obtainable from corporation
income tax returns. Within the corporate sector, the big business component
will be isolated. Assets will be compared in order to help describe the
financial structure. The effect of that str~zcture upon the disposition of
economic effort and returns will be more directly reflected in a breakdown
of data on income origin and income distribution.




The Corporation - A Symbol of Financial Concentration
According to Robert R. Doane, oorporations controlled one-firth of
business expenditures in 1870, and they surpassed the unincorporated enter
1
prises by 1920. (See Table 12).
TABI~ 12
BUSINESS EXPENDITURES, CORPORATE i~D NON
CORPORATE, 1870-1920
Year Corporate Noncorporate Year Corporate Nonoorporate
1870 21.0 79.0 1900 41.2 58.6
1880 24.2 75.8 1910 41.0 59.0
1890 31.0 69.9 1920 57.3 42.7
In a study made by Twentieth Century Fund for the year 1929, it was estimated
that corpor ati ons contributed 57 per cent of all income produced in private
enterprise.
The Three Financial Size Categories
It was observed in Kaplan’s study of financial concentrations that there
are three broad size categories of business organization, corresponding to
three scales of operation. In the first category, he places the unincorporat
ed enterprises and the small corporations that are managed by- the c~vne rs.




includes the major corporations that come under the heading of Big Business.
This breakdown by size is for convenience of financial analysis. It is sug
gested that all corporations up to a half million dollars of assets be
placed. in the small—scale category. This is suggested because the
corporations in the assets classes under $50,000 wore mainly in the income
or deficit classes below $2,100 per year, and incorporated i~ith assets of
$50,000 to $500,000 had average incomes and scales somewhat under those of
2
partnerships as a whole.
The intermediate corporate sector is regarded as representing a range
of corporate income from ~50,000 to $5 million.
The residue corporate segment - where asset per firm exceedes $50
million, or net income exceeds $5 million, is the big business sector. Here
the corporation is approaching the character of en investment pool which may
encompass a number of business divisions, an army of specialized and general
managers, and stockholders as numerous as employees. Kaplan points out
that “operations are on a national scale and usually extend to by-products of
the original line. The counterpart of the big business type of corporation
is not the individual proprietor or the owner-manager corporate enterprise,
but rather the aggregation of individual enterprises who together supply or
3
distribute the product of the large corporation. There were in all about
1,100 corporations in the big business sector in 1948. The big business
‘Ibid., p. 114.
2lbid.
counterpart to the large automobile firm with its billion in
aggregate assets, for example, is obviously not o~ seller but rather the
thousands of dealers who handle the product.
TABLE 13
COMPARISON OF TOTAL ASSETS WITH CAPITAL ASSETS, CORPORATIONS
WITH BALANCE SHEETS, 1948
Total Assets Capital Assets
________ ~ Total Assets
Industry ~ount ~o~t Per per Dollar of
(In millions ~ (In billions Cent Capital Assets
of dollars) of dollars)
All industries 525 100.0. 126 100.0 4.17
Fixiance,(banks,
trust compan
ies, etc.) 177 33.71 2 1.59 8.85
Insurance 67 12.76 1 .79 67.00
Real Estate and
lessors of
real property 21 4.00 15 11.90 1.40
Public Utilities 74 14.10 50 39.68 1.48
Manufacturers 122 23.24 41 32.54 2.98
Trade (wholesale
and retail 42 8.00 7 5.56 6.00
Mining. 9 1.71 4 3.17 2.25
Construction 4 .76 1 .79 4.00
Services (hotels,
theatres, etc.) 7 1.33 4 3.17 1.75
Agriculture,
forestry and
fisheries ~2 .38 1 .79 2.00
4




industrials, with which we are primarily concermed, consisted of about 360
1
corporations, each of which had assets of $50 million or more.”
The giant corporations are now distinguished from the remainder of the
corporate sector and the entrepreneurial sector. Just how large the big
business sector looms in the total financing of the economy will now be
determined. Assets and income will be used as a measure of this part of
concentration in big business.
2
The Distribution of Total Assets
For the most part assets of financial firms are duplications of the
assets of others and may connote little influence in the organization in
which the basic ownership resides. Kaplan comments, “total assets may vary
widely in the extent to which they are offset by debt and in the proportion
3
of liquid capital to fixed facilities.t’ Thus the problem of duplications
1The Federal Trade Commission’s list of 1,000 largest manufacturing
corporations in 1948 (including primary metals and petroleum) included
260 corporations with assets of ~50 million or more. To these i~u1d be added
the corporations in trade (with sales from $200 million up), and the largest
in mining, construction, motion pictures, and other service lines, to make
up the business sector of industrials. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 115.
2The term “total assets,” as used by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in
its Statistics of Income, includes in addition to capital assets the fbllow
ing general headings: cash, motes and accounts receivable, inventories,
government obligations, and other investments, land, sinking funds, deferred
charges, interest, rents and premiums due, guaranteed deposits and various
accruals. In the Bureau of Internal.Revenue definition, “amounts shown as
capital assets consist of (a) depreciable tangible assets, such as buildings,
fixed mechanical equipment, manufacturing facilities, transportation facili
ties, and furniture and fixtures; (2) depletable tangible assets—natural re
sources; (3) intangible assets, such as patents, franchises, formulae, cop~r—
rights, lease holds, goodwill and trade marks; and (4) land..” Ibid.
3Finanoe and insurance together accounted in 1948 for nearly half of
the total assets of corporate enterprise but less than two per cent of the
capital assets. In contrast, the public utility area, the total assets of
which consist mainly of fixed facilities, accounted for less than one seventh
Li ii hi hlka ~ih.hUilk*i~ll,ih i~iii~iii
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to some extent is removed by confining the study to industrial areas. It
is noted that out of the aggregate of $525 billion reported for all corpo
rations in 1948, total assets of industrial accounted for 184 billion - a
:1.
little more than one-third.
A comparison of assets by scale of organiiation is possible with the
three categories of small, intermediate, end big business, presented as
follows:
TABLE 14
DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL ABEAS OF SM~LL, INTERMEDIATE
AND BIG BUSINESS
Industrial Enterprises2
Assets Class Number I Total Assetsof (In billions
Firms of dollars)
Small—Unincorporated 3,265,200 46 76
Corporations under $500,000 330,706 30
Intermediate Corporations
($500,000 to $50 million) 33,564 82
Big Business Corporations
($50 million and o~er) 361 72
Totals 3,629,831 230
of total assets of all corporations but two—fifth of all capital assets. In
the relationships between capital and other assets, the area of industry upon
which the present study is concentrated - mining, manufacture, construction
trade, and services — occupied middle ground between finance and public
utilities. Total assets in trade (wholesale and retail) represented about
$6.00 for every $1.00 of capital assets. The total assets of manufactures
were about three and a half times capital assets. See Table 13, A Com




It may be noted that in the order of industrial business enterprises,
the financial assets of the 361 largest corporate organizations almost
equal the corresponding aggregate of the 3.6 million separate small—scale
enterprises. The small-scale enterprises are more than matched in assets
by the intermediate corporations.
It is indicated that in terms of total assets a very large portion of
the nation’s business resources is held by the large corporate organizations
of managerial enterprise which, though counted as single firms, are each an
aggregate equivalent to many small enterprises. It is well to point out,
as suggested in the discussion of output, that aside from differences between
industries, the largest corporations are those that require relatively large
accumulations of capital in order to operate in mass production areas. Ob
servations of statistics of corporations income published by the Bureau of
internal Revenue would suggest that the small enterprises have greater
1
earning power per dollar of assets. According to Kaplan’s study, in 1948
475,000 firms in the class under $500,000 of assets had $43 billion in
total assets with which they chalked up $93 billion of total receipts;
corporations of inter~aiate size showed $181 billion of receipts against
$184 billion of total assets; while the big business corporations had gross
receipts of $131 billion against total assets of $298~biflion.:.Inshort, the
small businesses averaged more then $2 of transactions per dollar of
assets, while the largest industrial enterprises had sales of less than 43
cents per dollar of assets. Apparently the major assets of the small enter—
priser - his ability to sell, render a service, or know—how-are not listed
~Ibid.
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on the balance sheet under total assets. Nonetheless, it i8 reasonable to
assume that corporations with huge assets, especially in the basic industries,
are able to make decisions of broad scope affecting other major areas of the
economy. Such decisione may wo rk for the good or adversity of the eoonomy.
For the purposes ofthis study, the concern is the statistical evidence of
the way in which the employment of financial resources concent rated in la.rg
scale business has affected the distribution of opportunities for sharing
in the national income. An ex~nination of the major components of the
national income will be made, and the distribution trend will be noted in
order to achieve this.
Division of the National Income
In 1929 the national income was *87 billion, but it declined to about
$40 billion in the depths of the depression and rose to $239 billion in
1950 and $305 billion in 1953. In 1953 the Gross National product was 2O~
larger than national income. It includes in addition depreciation of $30
billion, indirect business taxes of $30 billion, and net interest paid by
government of $5 billion, totaling $365 billion. Seven-eights of the na
tional income was distributed as personal income ($267 billion). Personal
income exceeded national income distributed, as individuals also received
$19 billion in transfer payments. After taxes, $250 billion of personal
1
income was available- for spending or saving. It appears that the national
income has increased. In constant dollars (1947) growth has averaged about
3 per cent per year. Since 1939 real output has more than doubled and real




output per capita has increased by almost three-fifths.
2
Kaplan suggests that the national income data be broken d~n into
three principle groups which combine to produoe the data. They e.re:(1)
private corporations; (2) unincorporated enterprises, including the self-
employed; (3) government and other (mainly non-profit) groups.
By examining the trend lines between 1929 and 150, it is found that
the shares of national income contributed by the corporate and non-corporate
sectors have remained relatively unchanged; the percentage chart (see Figure
3) shows that while there have been changes from year to year, there is no~
significant trend. Over the entire period the corporate sector consistently
originated about half of the total national output, the non-corporate sector
about one—third. For a closer examination of the components, three years,
1929, 1940,and 1948 have been selected. These years were selected mainly
because the national income series by legal form of organization begins
with 1929, Ihe distribution of national income in these three years is
3
relatively free from the impact of war, depression,or defense expenditures.
The share of national income originating in corporations, after a
decline during the depression years, returned by 1940 to the point where
it made up more than half of the national total; in 1948 the percentage
rose to 54.3. The government contribu~on also rose to a higher point in
1948 than 1929. The noncorporate fraction for 1948 was higher than 1940,
‘Ibid., p. 5.
2A. 1). H. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 118.
3lbid, p. 120.
~_I!,SMIk ~ ~!II,!I[I!lI~!
.....4 • • ••• ••ê~•~ •a•êea•~a~ .44 a •.~ • • ••
I a .~•,a...a•a•. ••~ I I a • • • I I •.•. a,
•4 • • •
. — a •I~ê ~4 • al_a.. . . — 1
Ia I % I I a a I I • • • .:....... ••~ I, •• •.:.
a....:. a • •• . — a • I al 4
•. . l.a ~ a a I •~•~a a • •a~_a . ~•. • • • •a •..•.‘• 4 a a a .••~ •
‘~__~_• •.S * a aS*~ • •.. •..•40~5.:1~1~.1 •
--~
1933 1937 1941
Fig. 3. National income by origin.a*
ateGover~ent and Othe r”: “Other” includes mainly income
originated by private households and nonprofit institutions; it
also includes the net inflow from abroad of dividends, interest,
and branch profits. National Income Supplement 1951, Table 12,
p. 157.
*Reproduced in A. D. H. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 119.
100% .._~.._a• •_,.
• ~. 4.a•a.. ..
-
• • :—~ .‘ • ~I • • • Sa —
•—..• a. •80




a • • •I•”~ a
a.. —~ •. ~




• a.... • • II
• ~ ~• • a
_a.• 4
a; . • •~. S





a •• •e. •














• • — ~. :
• • a • •• a a -.















but 1ov~or than in 1929. In the distribution of income originated, wages and
salaries of employees have accounted for all of the~ government segment, near
ly two thirds of the corporate, and one—third of the noncorporate. (See
Table j5~
Comparison of Allocations of Sectors,
Corporate end Noncorporate
It is evident from the distribution of the national income for the
selected years that the corporate sector originated the largest fraction of
the national payroll. The wages and salaries of employees for corporations
made up 34.6 per cent of the national income for 1929; the proportion was
1.2 per cent higher for 1940 and by 1948 had risen to 37.3 per cent. It
may be noted that the compensation of corporate officers, as a percentage
of national income, declined from 3.8 in 1929 to 3.0 in 1948.
Corporate net profits after taxes in 1929 were 9.9 per cent of
national income; in 1940 they were 7.5 per cent, and in 1948 8.0 per cent.
Corporate profits before income taxes for 1929 were 11.5 per cent of
national income, for 1940 they wore 11.0 per cent, and in 1948 they rose
to 13.8. This indicates an increasing percentage of the contribution by
corporations to the national income has been transferred to payrolls and
government income.
Compensation of employees in the noncorporate sector moved between
10.8 per cent of the national income in 1929 and 11.4 per cent in 1948.
Income to the en’treprenou~, the profits segment of the noncorporate sector,
moved from 15.9 per cent in 1929 to 17.8 per cent in 1948. There was a
decline of 5.3 per cent over the period in personal rents and interest.
The indications by the comparison are that since 1929 the corporate and
I ~i~I ~
TABLE 15
DISTRIBUTION OF NATI 0N~LL INCOME, CORPORATE AND NONCORPORATE
1929, 1940, 1948a
(~mount in Millions)
aBased on Tables 17 and 18 in A.D.H.
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Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 262-63.
. 1929 1940 1948
Percent Percent Percent
J~.mount National ~Amount National ~uount National
• Income Income Income
Corporate enterprise
Net profit after taxes 8,660 9.9 6,065 7.5 17,817 8.0
11.5 11.0 13.8
Income tax liability 1,398 1.6 2,878 3.5 13,028 5.8
Compensation of
Corporation officers 3,337 3.8 2,950 3.6 6,733 3.0
~ages and salaries 30,185 34.6 28,126 35.9 83,260 37.3
Net interest 1,617 1.9 1,224 1.5 570 .3
Totals 45,197 51.7 42,243 51.9 121,408 54.3
Noncorporate enterprise
Profits 13,927 15.9 12,660 15.6 39,751 17.8
Compensation of
Employees 9,430 10.8 8,588 10.6 25,379 11.4
Rents and intereat 8,538 9.8 5,498 6.8 9,885 4.5
• Totals 31,895 36.5 26,746 32.9 75,015 33.6
Government, govern
ment enterprises
and other 10,263 11.8 12,358 15.2 27,046 12.1
Total National Income 87,355 100.0 81,347 100.0 223,469 100.0
noncorporate sectors have achieved a rough balance in their contributions
to national iflcome. While the corporate sector has out stripped the non-
corporate sector in the size of contribution to total national income, the
picture in terms of profits is reversed. Corporate profits have accounted
for a smaller proportion of the national income than have the aggregate
profits of entrepreneur and other self-employed.
Since wages are inclined in noncorpor ate profits, due to no separation
of ownership and management in noncorporate enterprise, wages of management
cannot be segregated from profits. The ps~1~J4~n of the corporate and non—
corporate sectors is more realistically compared if salaries of corporate
officers are included in corporate profits. When doing this, it is observed
that the difference between corporate and noncorporate profits is much
smaller. Allowances must be made for the substantial, percentage by which
the corporate income tax reduces corporate profits. (See Figure 4).
Comparison of Growth of Large and Small Corporations
While other comparison has shown that there has been a parallel
sharing in the national economic growth by the corporate and noncorporate
sectors, it is desirable to examine other data to detez,nin8 whether or
not the growth of the big corporations has been made at the expense of the
smaller corporation. Kaplan presents certain data on this point which is
quite enlightening. (See Table 16).
Aooording to the distribution shown in Table 16, it seems that the cor
poratioxmin the giant category accounted for better than half of corporate













*Reproduced in A. D. H. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 122.
1940
Corporate and noncorporate income.*
(Percent of total national income)
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TABLE 16
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORA~TE INCOME BY INCOME
OR DEFICIT ci4ssEsa
1929
Incon~ or Deficit Number Per Cent Corporate Per Cent
Class of of Net Income of
(In dollars) Corporations Tots). (In millions) Total
5,000,000 and o~er 323 .07 $4,598 52.61
500,000-5,000,000 2,978 .65 2,344 26.82
50,000-500,000 24,009 5.26 1,378 15.76
Under 60,000 428,711 94.00 420 4.81
Totals 456,021 100.00 $8,740 100.00
1948
10,000,000 and over 423 .07 $13,194 40.94
1,000,000-lO,000,000 3,670 .62 8,615 26.73
100,000—1,00o,o0o 30,545 5.14 6,811 21.13
Under 100,000 559,605 94.17 3,611 11.20
Totals 594,243 100.00 $32,231 100.00
aComputed from Statistics of Income of the U.S. Bureau of Internal
Revenue, 1929, Pt. 2, pp. 23, 24, and 1948, Pt. 2, Table 7, p. 316, and
Table 9, p. 344 in A. D. H. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 124.
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in 1948. The second group of medium to large corporations appears to have
maintained approximately the same share of tots]. corporate inoome in both
periods. The percentage of total corporate incon~ attained by the two
groups in lower half of the scale showed a rise from 1929 to 1948.
Translating the data on net corporate profits before taxes into per
centage of total national income we get:
TABLE 17
NET CORPORATE PROFITS BEFORE T~AXES TO TOTAL
NATI ONAL INCOME (PERCENTAGE
1929 1948
All corporations 11.5 13.8
Big business 6.1 5.7
Medium to large 3.1 3.7
Small to medium 1.8 2.9
Very small .5 1.5
These figures show enough differences in relative status for the
earlier and later years to indicate that the smaller corporations have
probably improved their relative position with the general expansion of
the economy. The evidence here suggests that the growth of the large
corporations has moved along with a oorresponding expansion of economic
opportunities for wage earners, management, and investors at all levels
of businesses.
The Industrial Giants
Perhaps a view of the magnitude of a definite group of the largest
i~.:.ibiIII~I.~ ~. - [.iI:.;![::M~- . -:~: :-..~ .
61
corporations in ~Axnerioan industry against the magnitude of businsss gener
ally will shed more light on areas of financial concentration. In 1929,
according to Berle and Means, the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations
accounted for 49.2 per cent of the total assets of all nonfinancial corpora
tions and that, if the 200 continued their 1909-29 rate of growth, they would
1
control 70 per cent of all corporate business by 1950. This implies that
there would be little opportunity for new or smaller businesses. A review
of the proportions is essential in that context and in completing the
statistical perspective of this study.
Kaplan, on this same point, analyzes as a group the 100 largest cor
porations operating within the competitive sector of the economy in terms
of total assets. It is observed that “total assets of the 100 largest in
dustrials in 1948 aggregated about $49 billion. The total assets reported
by all industrial corporations in 1948 were $184 billion. The 100 largest
industrials thus accounted for nearly 27 per cent of the assets of all in-
2
dustrials.”
Share of All Industrial Profits
3
According to the above analysis, total profits before taxes of the
100 largest industrials in 1948 were $8.4 billion, or 30 per cent of the
profits of all corporate industrials, which amounted to 27.8 billion. The
share of the 100 largest in total busimess income, that is, income ~f
1Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property (New York, 1932), pp. 28-40.
2
A. D.H. Kaplan, op. cit., p.125
3lbid., p. 126.
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industrials, other busineses, corporations, and unincorporated enter
prises, amounted to a little more than 10 per cent. In the National In-
1
come Supplement, data are found for the following order by- sectors of total
business profits:
TABLE 18
BUSINESS PROFITS BY SECTORS
Millions of
Per Cent~ Dollars
100 Largest Corporations 8,357 10.3
. Otl~r Industrial Corporations 19,431 23.9
Nonindustrial Corporations 5,974 7.3
Sales Proprietorships and
Partnerships 40,146 49.3
Rental Income of Persons 7,506 9.2
Total 81,414 100.0
Taken as a group, it appears that the 100 largest industries account
currently for significant fractions of both the assets and the net income
of their own industrial segment, although the corporate income they repre
sent is a very small fraction of the national income total.
Regarding the trend in share of the 100 largest industrials, Kaplan
2






(In billions of dollars)
Total assets:
All industrial corporations 33.4 114.9 184.2
100 largest 8.2 29.3 49.1
Percentage of 100 largest 24.6 25.5 26.7
1
Trend in the income position.:
Profit before taxes:
All industrial corporations 1,686 6,552 27,788
100 largest 525 2,841 8,357
Percentage of 100 largest 31.1 43.4 30.1
2
Profits after taxes:
All industrial corporations 5,696 5,696 17,182
100 largest 2,507 5,128
Percentage of 100 largest 44.03 29.85
From the above data, vthioh is en approximation, it is seen that in assets
the top 100 industrials have apparently registered a. small fractional in
crease in their proportion of all industrial corporate assets, e’ven though
the number of corporations of lesser size •has increased. It is further
noted that there is a decrease in the income share of the 100 giants since
1929. This confirms the trend obtained from the BIR data of corporations
1lbid. Data is approximate.
____ p. 127. Data is approximate, especially rough for the year
1929, which antedates regular income tax returns and standards for public
ly issued financial statements.
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by income size categories discussed above. In these generalizations,
allowance must be made for the influence of changing bases for tax report
ing and accounting practices over the years.
In rounding out the statistical perspective of this.study,the 100
largest industrials will be viewed regarding changes. in ranking of industry
groups, shifting of leadership within industries, and the turnover record
among the groups. Finally, a restatement of the principal points of the
statistical analyses of big business concentrations will be made.
The 100 Largest Industrials
The significance of powerful concentrations of wealth and capital
resources in the top size category lies in ~whether this eliminates com
petition and seats the big business rigidly in positions of leadership and
domination or whether there is a dynamic situation with mobility in member
ship arid relative position and an income and outgo of new and old finns.
If the individual companies have maintained their positions of leadership,
it suggests a definite entrenchment. On the other hand, if there has been
mobility and the one time leaders have shifted, it suggests competition.
In order to note the industrial areas of big business growth and the
extent of change in the composition of the big business group during the
1909-48 period, Kaplan p~epared lisi~ of the, 100 largest~iñdustrials for
1
five selected years: 1909, 1919, 1929, l935,and 1948. The inclusion in
any one list was based on the amount of assets held by an individual com
pany during the given year. The five lists include 2.05 companies that





pars. They represent 20 industry groups. Miother observation, “The
industries ~nd their memberships are necessarily arbitrary. The large
firms — are not typically confined to single industries. For example, the
chemical companies as well as the metal companies are in the field of
metallurgy; the rubber companies produce plastic chemicals; the chemical
companies are producers of textile fibers; farm equipment manufacturers are
2
also in various electrical lines, and so on.”
Changes in Ranking of Indus try Groups
The ranking of these industry groups reveals that in 1909 the iron and
steel industry dominated the big business sectors of the economy, accounting
for 30.8 per cent of the ~8.2 billion block of assets held by the 100 largest
industrials. The nonferrous metal industry (mainly copper) was second,
accounting for 9.4 per cent of the 1909 block. In third place was the food
industry, with 8.2 per cent and so on down the chart (see Figure 5).
It is apparent that the 1948 list of 100 largest firms is divided
into industry groups in different proportions from those represented in the
1909 list. The decline in the proportion of aggregate assets held by the
iron and steel industry from 30.8 per cent of the 1909 block to 12 per cent
of the 1948 block, and the rise in the percentage of assets held by the
petroleum industry from 8 per cent in 1909 to 29 per cent in 1948 are most
noteworthy. Transportation equipment industry and the chemical industry,
in l948,seeni to have displaced the nonferrous metals and the food products



























































































Fig. 5. Industries represented by 100 largest industrials, 1909 and 1948
ranked by percentage of the aggregate assets of the 100.
*
(By Total Assets)
*Reproduced in A. D. H. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 134.
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Drastic shifts by other industries were also experienced during the
forty-year period. Private transportation, sixth in 1909, and leather,
thirteenth in 1909, no longer had any firms among the 100 largest by 1948.
Coal mining, in the upper half for 1909, barely retained a position at the
bottom of the 1948 list. As compared to this, gains were made by the
electrical equipment industry, which moved from tenth to fifth place during
the forty—year span, and retail distribution, which rose from eighteenth
to sixth. The manner in which growth patterns have varied is reflected in




According to Kaplan’s study, there have been significant shifts in
leadership within industries. In 1909 the iron and steel industry ranked
top and in 1948 ranked second. Within this industry, in 1909 United States
Steel alone accounted for 22 per cent of the assets of the 100 largest and
represented most of the assets. There were thirteen other steel companies;
however, who had assets large enough to make the list of the 100 largest.
In 1948 only 4 of the original 14 remained and there were 5 newcomers. The
9 companies representing steel in 1948 held less than 12 per cent of the
total assets in that year, compared with 30.8 per cent of the total held
by the 14 companies in 1909. United States Steel’s share had dropped to
5 per cent in 1948.
It appears that the nonferrous metals industry receded in rank from
second to sixth place during the:forty-year span. Only 5 of the 13 companies
1lbid., pp. 135—40.
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of 1909 were on the 1948 list. Alcoa and Kennecott joined the, size class
of Anaconda and International nickel to make up the new Big Four of the in
dustry.
The two, sugar companies that were prominent among the big trusts in
1909 were no longer among the 100 largest industrials in 1948. Three new
comers had taken their places by 1948.
In 1909 pet:roleum was dominated by Standard Oil of New Jersey, with
assets greater than those of the other members of this industry combined.
The parent company had grown greatly since 1909, notwithstanding the sepa
ration of its subsidiaries, but its percentage in petroleum now represents
a minor fraction of the expended industry’s total. Its place of leadership
has had to be shared with the former subsidaries, now independent, and with
11 other greatly expanded petroleum corporations of which only two were
on the list in 1909.
In coal mining, only one out of the original six big companies survived,
and in that instance a merger of two former members was necessary to give
the industry representation in 1948.
Many other shifts were nude among the twenty industries, including re
tailing, where Sears-Roebuck, the lone representative on the list, shared
representation in 1948 with 7 giants that were either nonexistent or well
below the category of the 100 largest in 1909.
It is reasonable to assume that the rise and fall in rank of: individual
companies were in some instances attributable to comparable cycles of the
industries to which they belonged - leather vs. plastics, ships vs. autos,
coal vs. petroleum. Yet some of the companies have had rates of growth far
beyond that of the industries with which they are associated, as in steel,
I ~ ~
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rubber, and food, while others have lost ground in industries such as
chemicals that have experienced general expansion.
The Turnover in Listing of the 100 Largest
Other observations felt to be significant in determining concentration
of leadership and total assets are borne out in the reoord of turnover in
1
the listing of the 100 largest industrials as presented by Kaplan.
Only 36 of the or~iginal 100 on the 1909 list were among the 100 largest
in 1948. The list for 1919 shows 47 companies that replaced the members
of the 100 largest in 1909. Of the 53 original companies that were still
among the 100 largest in 1919, 16 had failed to maintain a place by 1929.
Of the 47 that had joined the 100 largest for the first time in 1919, 14
had disappeared from the 1929 roster. The 1929 list includes two companies
from the 1909 group that had fallen out in 1919 but had made a comeback by
1929. The 1935 list shows 11 newcomers and between 1935 and 1948, 20 cora—
panies were replaced. Such turnover indicates that the positions of leader
ship were unsure ami maintained with great effort. it is a precarious
situation. It mi~it be assumed that some of these firms did not drop out
because of a decline in income; they Iwe continued to expand, but were
outstripped by others. If such were the case, then there is evidence of
competition.
By 1948 there remained 31 which had maintained membership in the
100 largest in each of the selected years. Five more had appeared on
the 1909 list but had dropped out in one or more of the three intervening
years. Of the remaining 64 on the 1948 list, 25 appeared first in 1909,
~-Ibid., pp. 145—55.
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14 in 1929, 5 in 1935, and 20 in 1948.
The more significant movements are those of firms near the top shift
ing down closer to the bottom and those near the bottom moving up near or
to the top. That is to say, numbers one, two,and three changing places
or numbers 98, 99, 100 nging places is not as significant as number one
changing with number 100 or number 2 with 65 and so on. The degree of
success of a particular firm should not be judged by whether it entered
or fell out of the list of 100 largest in a particular year. “It is only
when the total shifting of positions is considered, with 205 firms moving
in or out of the class of 100 largest industrials during the forty—year
span, that the evidence of challenge by competitors both new and old becomes
1
significant.
Kaplan points out that,
The majority of the oompanies included among the 100 largest
of our day have attained their position within the last two decades.
They are companies that have started new industries or have trans
formed old ones to create or meet consumer preferences. The oem—
panies that have not only grown in absolute terms but have gained
an improved position in their own industry may be identified as
companies that are notable for drastic changes made in product mix
and methods, generating or responding to new competition. There
are two outstanding eases - (General Electric and DuPont) are hardly
recognized as the same companies they were in 1909, except for re
tention of the name; for in each ease the product mix of 1948 is
vastly different from what it was in the earlier years, and the
markets in which the companies meet competition are incomparably
broader than those that accounted for their earlier place at the
top of their industries.2
It could be held that these firms exemplify the changes in the market




years and a general growth rather than an entrenchmerr~ of supremacy. It
should not be assumed that those now at the top can remain there, no more
than did their predêeessors, without alert participation in continuous
product and market development.
These indications of mobility of position among the 100 largest in
dustrials suggest that the large—scale corporations have no secure entrench
ment by virtue of size. There are implications, however, that much of .the
strongest, direct competition felt by a big business in its major lines is
likely to be from other big firms or those growing into big business.
Restatement of the Statistical Position
of Big Business
In Part I of the study of concentrations, employment was viewed in
terms of all outlets for the earning of livelihood, including employees
and self-employed in agriculture, the professions, the government, and
nonprofit institutions, to indicate the range of alternatives in sharing
economic opportunity. Approximately eight million members of the 60 million
labor force of recent years have been in the big corporations of 10,000
or more employees. In Part II, data bearing on the concentration of
business output were examined, and the groat variety of size patterns
to be found among the different branches of industry were noted with
corresponding variation from industry to industry in the degree of depend
ence upon large or upon small units to make up the larger portion of produc
tion. In Part III, obaervations.of the data on the distribution of financial
resources indicated that an important, if minor, fraction of the business
assets of the nation was accumulated in the area of the large industrials.
It was noted, within the industrial area itself, that the portion that
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cane within the framework~ of big business represented almost a third of
total assets. The big business sector roughly matched the total assets
of the much more numerous block of intermediate sized industrial
corporations, as well as the total assets of the several million firms
that were in the small business category. Yet, the presence of these
differing degrees of business coordination - from the giant corporation
to the single enterprise - seems to have worked out into annual distri
butions of the national income that yielded the major part of business pro
fits, and of wages, salaries end managerial income to components outside
the big business industry sector.
The review of the 100 industrials affords statistical evidence con
cerning the continuing.challenge to the established position of current
industry loaders. The presentation of evidence of mobility of big business
leadership is not intended to infer that fear may thereby be dissipated
concerning concentration of financial power in specific areas of business,
nor can it be inferred that there is no need for collective defense against
misuse of great financial resources. Realistically, the data do indicate
that there is no justification in identifying increase in financial re
sources of big business with net decline in the scope and rigor of corn—
petition. This presumption can be tested only when the goals of big
business are examined and the consequent contribution of its performance
to the objectives of a competitive society are evaluated.
NIU~ ~fl*h.m&II~[~I.L,~,
CHAPTER IV
THE HEASURE OF PERFORMANCE
The task of measuring the performance of the means by which the
economy may best attain the desirable economic goals is a complex one.
It has been established that the social maximization of employment, out—
put, and income is the goal of welfare economics. It has been assumed
that a free competitive order, perhaps, serves this end best. It is felt
that price stability is possible not only in a system of purely competitive
control where there is free market adjustment for all prices, but also in
1
a system of varied price mechanisms. Such a point is discussed by Dahl
and Lindblom as: spontaneous price mechanism,which has a distinguishing
supplementary control-intra industry substitution; bargaining price mechanism,
whose supplementary control lies in manipulation of the field of bargainers,
/i~nder bargaining price mechanism would come: (a) competitive bargaining,
manipulated throu~i substitution, and (b) non-competitive bargaining, mani
pulation by other method~7; hierarchical price mechanisrn,whioh~is controlled
supplementary by command arid manipulation of the field by government; and
autonomous price mechanisin,which is characterized by autonomous behavior
and no supplementary control is required. The common control to all price
mechanisms is held to be primary control through spontaneous interproduct
2
substitution. J. IC. Gaibraith a~ears to hold that the American economy is
1The price system., Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom feel, is a
more comprehensive control system than that oridinarily embraced in the
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1
essentially a bargaining society.
According to Dahi and Lindblom, each of the price mechanisms listed
above
...is necessary to economizing. Any complex society intelligently
bent on using its resources efficiently must, unavoidably, make use
of all four of them. Any society that attempts to exclude any one
of them altogether is bound to be poorer.2
These observations concerning price mechanisms are kept in mind when
comparing the effects of competition, monopoly, and oligopoly on employment,
output, and income.
Competition, Monopoly, Oligopoly, and Economic Welfare
Joe S. Bain states that:
The market performance of any type of industry may be evalu
ated from the standpoint of its contribution to aggregate economic
welfare by inquiring into the impact of welfare of the response which
the industry makes to the effective demand for its outpixt.’
Employment and Output
Examination of the two firms in equilibrium, the monopolist and the
competitive seller in Chapter II, revealed that the monopolist is able in
the long run to gain excess profits while the competitive seller cannot.
This is because the monopolist’s margainal costs are below price. Marginal
costs equal marginal revenue at some point below price. The competitive
seller’s marginal costs not only equal marginal revenue at a 1oin-b, but
‘John K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Counter
vailing Power (Boston, 1952), pp. 115ff.
2DahL and Lizxtblom, ~p. cit., p. 172.
3Joe S. Bain, Price Theory (New York, 1952), p. 235.
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also equal price at this point. In other words, the monopolist has a
negatively inclined demand curve, and a competitive seller has a perfect
ly elastic demand curve.
Since the oligopolistic seller lies somewhere between monopoly and
competition, it may be presumed that his behavior will be somewhere between
the acts of the former two. kin has this. comment to share:
The presumptive impact of oligopolistic behavior on output and
employment follows from the fact that its performance with respect
to determination of price, output and profits, tends either to ap
proximate that of monopoly or to lie somewhere between the monopolistic
and competitive extremes. It may accomplish approximately a full mo
nopolistic restrictive of output (under given demand and cost con
ditions) or only some smaller restriction, possibly approaching a
competitive output.l
As a result of the monopolist’s unique position of being able to control:
his output and therefore price, he can exercise more influence on the
economy, if in significant industries, than a competitive seller. Similar
ly, the oligopolists, if through their actions of collusion, tacit agree
ments, or other group conduct act as one, can exercise great influence on
the economy.
It is assumed that employment, output, and income move in the same
direction and that any action or condition of one will have similar effect
on the other. This being the case, a monopolist who decided to restrict
his output would in effect reduce employment. This would result in income
reduction to the employees. As per employee the monopolist already receives
a greater share of income. Such a situation fails to. meet the ideal of the
economy. All the same, if the monopolist produced a competitive type out
put, output would not be restricted and the recurring effects on employment
‘Ibid., p. 344.
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and income would be favorable.
It is argued by Bain that
•..with given industry demand and with the monopolist’s marginal
cost function the saute as the competitive industry’s supply curve,
the monopolist will produce a smaller long-run output than the
competitive industry. That if the monopolist has different costs
because of differences in firm scale, technique, or factor prices,
monopoly may produce either a larger or a smaller output than a
competitive industry would in the same situation. Ne~ertheless,
monopoly generally tends to produce less than a competitive type
output, where price would equal average cost or the money value of
marginal real cost or both.1
He indicates that although the monopolist has absolute superiority
over competition in a certain industry, it fails to meet the ideal standard
of an output at which cost is in a certain relation to price. The monopolist
does not produce to his break—even point - where price equals average cost.
The competitive firm, having only one alternative, must produce more.
Actually its output tends to be relatively too large. Examples may be seen
in many farm commodities as wheat, potatoes, broom corn, and others.
It was suggested that monopolistic restriction of output would have
certain effects on employment. Assuming cost (both real and monetary) and
demand to be the same with monopoly or competition, the monopolistic output
restriction would carry with it a corresponding restriction of employment
of all productive factors. lttherever it produces a smaller output than a
competitive industry would and has no higher real costs, it employs fewer
factors. It may on the other hand, duo to lowered real costs through in
creased real efficiency in scale or in technique, produce as great or greater
an output than the competitive industry. Again employment will also be less,
‘Ibid., p. 238.
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even though output is greater up to some limit.
Bain explains thatin spite of ttthe case as regards absolute effects
on employment, it would tend to employ fewer factors than if it reached an
1
tidealt output.” The significance of this from the viewpoint of over-all
output and employment in the economy is stated thus:
It is at least possible that monopoly (as compared to a compe—
:bitive~ alternative) will restrict both output and employment
(and raise the price) in an industry. The prices of monopolized
goods are raised relatively to those of competitive goods~ buyers
substitute the competitive goods for the monopoly goods in some
degree; fewer monopoly goods are produced and purchased and fewer
factors employed in producing them. Although there may be a re
striction of the output of monopoly goods; however, there is not.
necessarily a restriction of the aggregate output of the eco
nomy. If the resources excluded from employment in monopolized
industries move freely to other industries, and if in those other
industries money factor prices adjust downward relatively to in
dustry demand curves, so as to permit absorption of the otherwise
disemployed factors, aggregate employment will not be impaired.2
The indications are that f~ill employment is possible with a coadjust
ment of the general level of money purchasing power and the general level
of money factor prices. The effect of restrictions are on allocation of
resources an~ng the production of various products and on the distribution
of income. If unused resources are available for employment in the monopo
lized industry and are immobile so that they do not shift to other in
dustries when unemployed, then the effects are on aggregate employment.
Another situation in which.the effects are on employment are when the
factor prices do not adjust relatively to over—all demand or money purchas




The indications have been that the purely competitive industry tends
to produce a maximal output and employment under given conditions of demand
and cost and that there is a virtual reduction of output and employment
under monopoly, tempered where monopoly is more efficient. In the economy
as a whole, pure competition does not assure full employment unless factor
prices automatically adjust relative to money income to assure it; that if
they do not so adjust, monopoly tends to reduce employment; that if they
do adjust, monopoly will also give full employment.
Looking at the oligopolistic industry again, if the oligopolistic in
dustry behaves like a single—firm monopoly, through collusion, the above
observation about monopoly would apply to it also. Regarding oligopolistic
industries that behave like single—firm monopolies, Bain points out that
The restriction effects are present, but no actual restriction
of employment may result when economy-wide adjustments of prices
• and money spending are taken into account. If oligopoly is in a
sense quasi-competitive, so that, with given demand and cost, out
put is less restricted and prioe is lower, the virtual tendency
to restrict employment is lessened. The net effect on employment
will depend largely on how the somewhat lower profits, that re
sult affect the relation of investment plus consumer spending to
• the level of factor prices, and this is not easily predicted.1
Here is suggested e’~idenoe that the oligopolistic industry is somewhat
closer, even without collusion, to the monopoly, than to competition, in
that restrictive effects are present. The study turns now to a discussion
of Income Distribution.
Income Distribution -
It has been shown that due to the negatively inclined demand curve
the monopolist is able to realize excess profits eventually althoughthe
1lbid., p. 345.
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continued enjoyment of these depend on the demand for his goods. It is
possible for the monopolist to set his price and relate it to a decided out
put. It is assumed that the monopolist wants to protect his market from
entrants. This being the case, his price adjustment would be one that
would afford some excess profits but not attract entrants. In instances
where there is no threat of entry, it is expected that his excess profits
would be large, end where there is a threat to entry, it is expected that
his excess profits be smaller. In any case, however, some excess profits
are possible. If this is true, the income from sales of any monopolized
industry tends to be distributed differently between the factors of
production than it would under pure competition. The hired factors as
separated from the owners, would receive a smaller proportion of the in
dustry income than the owner. The owners tend to have larger personal in
comes on the average than the hired factors. This is indicati~ve of in
equality of personal income distribution. In a competitive industry, this
is not expected or possible due to the absence of excess profits, which
means also that there is no ‘contrived scarcity.’
According to Bain,
Monopoly in only one or a few industries...would not have very
great effects on economy-wide income distribution. It would not
necessarily be true...that hired factors employed in the monopolized
industries would receive lower wage rates or other factor prices
than those in other industries. So far as these factors were
freely mobile to other industries, factor prices would tend to be
equalized among monopolistic and other industries, and the impact
of monopoly excess profits would be spread thinly over all other
income recipients in the community. The income distribution ef
fect would be present, but it would not redistribute an important
fraction of the total society. A few monopolists would be richer;
everyone else would be very all ly poorer. If monopoly becomes
wide spread, however, so that sellers in all or most industries re
ceive monopolistic excess profits, their income distribution may
differ greatly from that of a purely competitive economy. The
~ ~ ~~
80
general level of hired factor prices will be substantially depressed
relative to the level of community prices, and the resulting dif
ference will be received as excess profits by monopolistic enter
prises.1
It seems that in a monopolistic industry whether, one, a few, or wide
spread, there is to some degree, an inequitable distribution of income. In
a competitive industry,the income distribution seems to be more equitable.
An attempt will now be made to appraise income distribution in oligopolistic
industries.
It has already been noted that oligopolistic industries behave some
what like the single—firm monopoly. For this reason, it is expected that
performance of these industries regarding income distribution will be
similar to that observed in monopolistic industries. On this point Bain
states:
The effect of oligopolistic pricing on the distribution of income
as between profit recipients and hired factors of production will evi
dently be contingent on the extent to which collusion permits the oh
gopohists to attain monopolistic results and on the condition of en
try. It is possible at least in highly concentrated oligopolies
with difficult entry conditions, that effective collusion on price,
output, product, and sales promotion will permit a close approxi
mation to the results attributed to monopoly with difficult entry.2
It appears from this that there is tendency to be excess profits and
a corresponding effect on income distribution in the direction of greater
inequality.
Further comments by Bain seem to offer some temperance:
It seems on balance probable, however, with only moderate
barriers to entry evident in many oligopohies, and with moderate




more frequently tend to be lower than full monopolistic profits
and often quite moderate or small, although...nOt so low as the
zero level attributed to pure competition.’
Such a lowering of profits may be assigned to limiting pricing de
signed to forestall entry and to imperfection of collusion, independent
policies or rivalry with respect both to price and to product and sales
promotion. These necessary conditions were discussed at the end of Chapter
II. “Such departures from effective collusion may not oridinarily elininate
excess profits entirely, but they will reduce them both by lowering prices
2
and by increasing oosts.’~
From these observations, it appears that in a substantial fraction of
oligopolistic industries excess profits may tend to be significantly lower
than they would be under single firm monopoly, although larger than under
pure competition.
Empirical Evidence of Monopoly Behavior
In. the foregoing discussion, attempts have been made to appraise the
general significance of monopoly behavior for the welfare of the economy,
at least so far as it can be determined by exploring the logic of monopo
list’s price and output policies. All conclusions arrived at concerning
the action of monopolies have an abstract basis. By description of
relevant market conditions faced by the monopolist or oligopolist in
certain assumptions and by deducing the course of monopoly action directed
at maximizing profits, the conclusions were reached. At this point an in





evidence of actual behavior, by monopolists or oligopolists.
Aluminum: Aluminum Company of America
The aluminum industry afforded a single-firm monopoly from 1901 until
after i~orld ‘~ar II. Since 1947, the disposal of government war plants has
resulted in the entry of two more companies to make a Big Three in primary
1
aluminum. This industry is now oligopolistic. Another industry, the
rubber tire industry, has been selected because in it substitutes are lack-•
ing and four big firms dominate it.
About 1901 the Pittsburgh Reduction Company incorporated the United
States Aluminum Company as the principal fabricating subsidiary, and the~pro
2
duction of stamped cooking utensils was undertaken. At the same time the’
company began an integration program that extended all the way to the con
sumer through the aluminum cooking utensil company.
“The next move toward further integration was in the direction of raw
materials.” By 1902, the gap between mining and aluminum reduction was
closed by the construction of a six acres plant at East St. Louis for refin
ing bauxite. Later railroads were built to afford trunkline connections.
A series of organizations followed~and by 1910 the Aluminum Company had a
4
highly integrated concern.
1A. D. H. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 95.
H Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum Industry (Cambridge,





The securing of a patent on basic extraction process, the Bradley
patent,enabled the monopoly to exist unchallenged until 1909. Thereafter,
monopoly was maintained largely by Alcoa’s substantial control of the
necessary ore reserves, secured by integration, and an alert policy in deal
ing with potential new entrants to the industry. Protective tariffs excluded
foreign competition.
Regarding price policy, Bain comments,
The price policy followed by Alcoa over a long period of years
seems to have been roughly consistent with what theory would lead
us to expect from a monopoly. Aluminum—ingot prices were on the 2
average high enough to yield excessive profits over a long period.
It appears that in some instances Alcoa’s prices were lowered,and some
immediate profits were sacrificed in order to promote the growth of the de
mand for aluminum and thus enhance future profits.3
The scale and rate of utilization of Aloca’s plants.soemed, in
general, to be consistent with maximum efficiency. The company
was by 1930 considerably larger than the minimum size necessary
to realize all the economies of large scale, but that it had become
large enough to encounter serious diseconomies was not evident.
Aluminum output was virtually restricted so far as price was pre
sumably higher than long—rim marginal cost.4
Alcoa’s monopoly was not complete. As any monopoly must, it
had its limits. For Aluminum ingot, it faced the growing compe
tition of aluminum scrap metal, which is suitable for some but
not all of the uses to ~thich aluminum is put. Some of the pro-
ducts made from aluminum, moreover, which Alcoa produced in in
tegrated operations, faced effective competition by substitutes,
whereas others did not. Aluminum electric cable for a time can
peted with copper cable..., but aluminum alloys for aircraft had
1lbid., pp. 5-6.
2J. S. Bain,’ op. cit., p. 264.
3D. H. Wallace, op. cit., pp. 13—14.
4J. S. Bain, ~p. cit., p. 264.
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no effective substitutes. This led Alcoa to pursue a pricing
policy, common to monopoly but also theoretically predictable —
namely, discrimination among the prices charged to different class
es of buyers.1
Wallace cites various instances of price discrimination on bases of
2
Hprioes paid for the basic aluminum components.” It is said that, in
order to compete successfully with copper, the Alumini.nn Company of ~inerica,
which had no competitors in the fabrication of aluminum cable, often sold
this commodity at prices yielding lower revenues per pound of aluminum than
3
were gained in other markets.
By having joint control of patents, covering the process of extracting
magnesium and making it serviceable for structural use, Alcoa kept magnesium
out of significant use. This, together with a price policy for magnesium
high above aluminum, enabled Alcoa to protect its position from intrusion
of substitutes until World War II, when the government undertook to stimulate
magnesium production.
There seems to be much in the history of the market behavior in the
aluminum industry which is consistent with the general theoretical predictions
discussed.
As stated, After 1947, Alcoa no longer held the aluminum industry
alone. The government made it possible for two other firms to enter the
industry. This is significant in that now the buyers of aluminum have a
somewhat wider choice of sellers and this is felt to enhance competition,
‘Ibid., p. 264.
2D. H. Wallaoe, op.cit., p. 218.
____ pp. 2l8—l~.
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at least to the degree of oligopoly. Aluminum will now be reviewed on
the basis of market competition with substitutes.
A. D. H. Kaplan mades some observations which are noteworthy. The
characteristic of aluminum production that has dote rmined its market history
is that the product has few natural or exclusive uses. The scope of the
product variations that have a bearing on its usability may be sensed from
the following list of properties regarded by the industry as the most do
1
cisive in the c~upetition of aluminum with other materials~
weight ductibility
heat conductivity ability to forn alloys
adaptability to casting compression strength
ease of machining coefficient of expansion
malleability adaptability to extrusion
corrosion resistance tensile strength
reflectivity electric conductivity
adaptability to forging elasticity under varying
appearance temperatures and pressures
hardness
The market for aluminum has been largely determined, in almost every
case, by the success of the metal in its struggle for preference over
established materials and in withstanding competition of new ones.
Professor J. W. Richards, writing in The Mineral Industry for 1909, re..
marked that
...aluminuin seems finally to have attained a position among corn
moröial metals where it is treated entirely on its merits. In the
early days of the industry, the olaim~ for aluminum, with regard
to its non—corrosive qualities, lightness, and other distinguishing
characteristics, were so exaggerated that it failed to.measure
up to expectations thus created. It was tried in many uses to
which it was not suited, and a reaction occurred, so that the real
merits which the metal possesses have been somewhat discounted for
a number of years. This condition no longer exists and today al
uminum is ranked among metals according to its real value.2
1A. D. H. Kaplan, pp. cit., p. 97
2o H. Wallace, op. cit., p. 14.
~TABLE 19
CONSUMPTION OF ALUMINUM IN UNITED STATES, BY INDUSTRY, SELECTED YEARS 1909~48*
(Amount in Millions of Pounds)
1909 1920 1930 1939 1948
Industry AmOunt Per Per A3liount Per Amount Per Amount Per
Cent Cent Cent Cent Cent
Total Consumption 34 100 200 100 220 100 410 100 1,560 100
Cooking Utensils 12 35 25 12.5 30 14 35 9 90 6
Transportation
(Land, Air, Water) 6 18 100 50 85 38 153 37 325 21
Electrical 5 15 10 5 32 15 48 11 100 6
Iron and Steel Metal
lurgy 10 29 25 12.5 24 11 32 8 60 4
Machinery and Elec- V
trical Appliances —— V —— 10 V 22 10 60 15 225 14
Building Construc
tion —- —- -- —- 9 4 14 3 425 27
Chemical —— —— —— —— 4 2 13 3 30 2
Packaging -- -- V 7 3 30 8 90 6
Miscellaneous i 30 15 7 3 25 6 215 14
*~J•5• Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, Various Years, and Estimates Furnished by Aluminum
Corporation of America. Taken from Kaplan, op. cit., p. 96.
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Looking at the radical shifts in the importance of various industries,
as oixtlets for aluminum products (see Table 19), it is found that aluminum
in transportation equipmerrt (a good example) changed from less than one-
fifth of the 34 million pounds of aluminum consumed in 1909 to 50 per cent
by 1920. In 1939 this percentage had fallen to 37; by the close of the
1940’s it was down to 21. The replacement of aJ.iiminum for steel in the
automobile industry probably accounts for these shifts.
On the decline of its uses in automobiles came new opportunities in
the building industry. Between 1909 and 1920 aluminum disposed of only a
small fraction of its output to the building industry. In 1930, four per
cent of the aluminum consumption was for building materials. By 1948, the
building industry was the largest industrial consumer of aluminum, account
ing for 27 per cent of consumption.
“Aluminum shares the market about equally with galvanized iron for
metal roofing, but it supplies only about four per cent of all roofing
materials, including wood shingles, asbestos, tile, slate, asphalt, and
1
the newer plastic compositions.t’
In the expansion of power transmission lines a prolonged and
successful battle has been waged for aluminum to share the market
with copper. In the early years of this century, copper accounted
for more than 70 per cent of the kilowatt miles of electrical
wiring. ...now...aluminum...aocounts for about 65 per cent of the
kilowatt lines of electrical wiring.2
Looking at the annual average price of aluminum and copper (see Table
20), it seems that, in 1909 the price per pound for aluminum was twice that
of copper. Since then its price has undoubtedly been influenced by competition
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a.Ajnerican metal market annual reports. Prices were fixed by govern
ment regulation during the World Yiar II period.
*T~en from A. 0. H. Kaplan,,op._cit., p. 257.
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with copper; and in the drives for entry and the holding of position in
many markets the price of aluminum has fallen until it is now, 1947 to 1951,
at least below that of copper. Here again, is evidence of the aci~ions pre
dictable for a monopoly in order to hold its position in a market. Histori
cal price series for primary aluminum shows that over the relatively short
period prices varied little; this suggests that the price was decided by
the chief producer. The continuous record indicates that ultimately.
assuming sons influence by the two entrants, the price has been determined
competitively. The case of aluminum seems to be a case of infinite opportu—
•nities for substitution, but the rubber tire case has no ready substitute.
Rubber Tire Industry: Oligopoly with Rival Markets
A concentration ratio of 75 per cent of new tire output in the hands
of four large manufacturers seems high enough to make a favorable setting
for a controlled market at stable prices. Here the structure of the
market should supply a partial answer to the theoretical predictions for
control of competition by an oligopoly.
There seems to be two distinct markets for domestic tire consumption.
The original equipment market accounts for about 28 per cent, and the re—
1
placement market accounts for 72 per cent of the tire business. (See
Table 21). The replacenent demand, in turn, is met through several media.
From the table,it is noted that new tire replacements equal about 54 per
cent of the total domestic market; recaps and retreads equal about 18 per
cent. The replacement market is divided into two segments, those sold





ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF DOMESTIC TIRE MARKET, 1952*
BY MARKET SEGMENT AND SHARE OF THE BIG FOURa
101 Million Tires ~ 100 Per Cent
Per Cent of Market
Market Segment Per Cent of Segment
Grand Total
~ Big Four Others
Original Equipment 28.1 97.7 2.3
Replacement-New Tires 53.8 66.1 33.9
Manufacturer—Owned Brands . 38.8 67.4 32.6
Private Brands 15.0 62.7 37.3
Recaps and Retreads 18.1 .9.4 90.6
Totals 100.0 64.8 35.2
aflata from Rubber Manufacturerst Association and Individual Tire and
Automotive Manufacturers.
presumed that manufacturer brands are sold chiefly by the dealer agencies
of tire producers. Private brands, though made by the tire manufacturer,
compete with the manufacturers’ own brands in sales by the ~itomobile equip
ment chains, filling stations, independent dealers, and mail order houses.1
*Fo~d in A. D. H. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 99.
Federal Trade Commission investigation revealed that Good Year
Tire and Rubber Company sold tires to Sears, Roebuck under the brand
name ‘All State’ which were of the same quality as those marked by Good
Year under its own ‘All Weather’ brand. The difference in wholesale
prices between these two brands ranged from 29 to 40 per cent in the
period 1927—33, at retail, All State tires were sold at prices 20 to 25
per cent below those of All Weather tires.” See R. M. Alt and iN. C. Brad
ford, op. cit., p. 347.
I ~fl~I ~ ~I
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Kaplan demonstrates the changes of the three replacement market sectors~
1926 1933 .1941 .1947 .1952
Manufacturer’s Brand-New 90.6 74.2 57.1 61.1 54.0
Private Brands—New 9.6 20.0 26.0 27.5 20.9
Recaps sndRetreads —— 5.8 16.9 11.4 25.2
In 1926 nearly all replacements came from manufacturers’ brands - a
very small per cent fr~n private brands and none from recaps and retreads.
By 1952, private brands and recaps accounted for nearly half of the total
replacements.
The manufacturers deal in original rquipment markets, with the auto
mobile manufacturers. In the replacement market, he deals with large mail
order houses, filling stations, and other large buyers promoting their
private brands.
Regarding new tire output, the Big Four produce approximately 75 per
cent of the domestic output of new tires, yet the overall percentage is not
2
applicable to the separate market. This is evident in Table 21. In 1952,
the Big Four, as a. group, had more then 97 per cent of the original equipment
market, 67.4 per cent of new tire replacements in manufacturers’ brands,
62.7 per cent in private brands, and 9.4 per cent of retreading and re
capping.
The price range in 1952 for various grades of 6.70-15/4 ply passenger
care tires was from ~l2.95 to ~40.70 for Blackwell, and from ~27.00 to ~47.90
3
for V~lhitewall.




Data on the tire industry suggest that in the presence of a Big Four,
producing the major fraction of a commodity for which there is no ready
substitute, the market may~nonetheless,dovelop for the consumer some degree
of competitively differentiated lines, akin to the effects of ready substi
tution that were shown in the case of aluminum. In the more recent years,
prices in these industries tend to indicate that these oligopolies are near
er to a quasi-competitive industry than a single-firm monopoly.
ChAPTER V
STThI~MARY ~1~D CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study has been to discover, by quantitative
nieasurements,the place of monopolies in the national economy and to evalu
ate the performance of monopolies in terms of economic welfare criteria.
quantitative measurements make pos sible a knowledge of the position of mo
nopolies in the market structure~ and performance affords knowledge for
evaulation as a competitive influence.
The distinguished welfare criteria are: (1) full employment, (2)
security, (3) the highest and most efficient produotion possible, (4) an
equitable distribution of income ai~ng factors of production, (5) a maximum
utilization of resources, (6) a progressive system,and. (7) price stability.
The ~Americen system of free enterprise presupposes a social maximization of
employment, output, and income. It is the goal of the economy. The achieve
ment of this goal is assumed desirable under a free enterprise system,,where
there is a minimum of government intervention and an absence of monopolistic
domination.
The process of developn~nt of the American economy of free enterprise
has brought a series of changes in the type of business organizations
and markets. It has moved fràm a free and simple market of single enter
prises of the early ~Amerioan era to a more complex market arrangemsnt of
trusts, pools, and modern corporations. Population increases and expansion
of the frontier account for larger and more numerous markets. The necessity
of meeting the demands of this growing economy led business men to combina
tions. It became necessary to nave huge capital accumulations, efficient
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management, and improved techniques in order to maintain an industry effec
tively. Government participation became necessary as villages, tov~ and
cities grew larger and more complex. Government took its role in order
to regulate operations and curtail possible abuses of big businesses. In
certain areas, such as public transportation, communication, banking, and
national defense, government was given control. Aside from protection
against exploitation of the general public, the function of government
serves to eliminate economic wastes or duplication, aid needy businesses,
and protect the health end welfare of the economy in general. Thus, the
system of free enterprise lends itself not only to the continued functions
of the single proprietor bixt also to the birth of monopoly end forms of
combined organizations which may often behave like monopoly. The nature of
the system encourages a degree of participation by the government. As a
result, our modern economy consists of single enterprises, big business,
and government.
The essence of competition is to enlarge the volume of sellers in
markets with whom buyers may deal freely through the market process.
Freedom and opportunity of selection, with the “invisible hand” as the im
personal final arbiter, are expected to minimize exploitation and assure
the maximum use of resources. This is assumed to be true because the de
mand curve in a competitive industry or market - the market of pure com
petition, in which there are innumerable buyers and sellers, none of them
individually capable of influencing the total market supply, demand, or
price - is perfectly elastic and price is at a point where marginal costs
equal marginal revenue. The presence of monopoly removes the “invisible
hand” as the impersonal final arbiter. This is so because monopoly means
I .[d~ I~i I~j:Sh~ ~~~~ .:~ ~
96
control of a supply of goods or services by one seller, therefore, price.
The buyers must pay the price offered by the monopoly. This is assumed to
be true because the demand curve under monopoly is negatively inclined and
leads to the equalizing of marginal cost and marginal revenue at a point
less than price. Such an arrangement also permits excess profits for the
monopoly and tends to cause restriction of output under monopoly. The
market or industry of a few is said to be oligopolistic, end. actions by
one will have some corresponding effects on the others. In order to realize
a maximi.m~ profit and avert price wars, which may ruin all of the members of
the oligopoly, it is expected that these sellers will maintain uniformity
of conduct; therefore, approximate monopoly. Thus, we conclude that neither
monopoly nor oligopoly conform to the concept of competition.
The significance of monopolistic or oligopolistic industries or markets~
in the economy,may be said to lie in whether they afford significant approach
es to the goal of welfare economics or whether theytend to limit or restrict
the approach. It is assumed that employment, output, and income move in the
same direction, and any condition of one will have similar effects in the
others. The.degree of employment, degree of production, and the degree of
an equitable distribution of income among the factors of production are thus
pulses of the welfare of the economy. The existence of a highly concentrated
segment of employment, output, or income in a monopolistic or.oligopolistic
industry would mean that these factors would be influenced by the conduct
of the industry and may bring adverse effects on the society, if these factors
are not mobile and do not shift to other industries or areas. The condition
is on the behavior of the industries. Concentration implies the paver of a
few large enterprises to direct the course of business activity and to
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dominate positions in markets resulting from their share of the nations
economic resources.
It is shown by- examination of the statistics of employment that in
1950 there were 60 million persons employed in the United States. Of this
employment, 69 per cent were in the business sector end 31 per cent in the
non—business sector. In the business sector, according to a size distribution,
3,100 big finns accounted for one—third of all the business employment. The
distribution of employees, by size of business, appears to have changed radi
cally- over the past forty- years. Regarding the trend in number of busi
ness firms, it appears that opportunities for the individual enterprise
have not declined perceptibly during the four decades preceding the war,
except during the great depression. It may be said that the status of the
giant firm has grown with the economy but has had no measurable effect on
the distribution of total economic opportunity as measured by employment.
It has revealed the position of big business as representing a minor fraction
of the whole area of economic outlets and as accounting for tkle major portion
of employment in certain industries.
The statistics of concentration of output revealed that the concentra
tion ratio tends to he high where capital requirements are high and that
where business can be operated with little capital the concentration ratio
is low. It appears that the areas where capital requirements are high are
areas of mass production and high degree of technology, as in motor vehicles
and parts and steel works, while the concentration ratio is low in areas
that require little capital as men’s clothing and women’s apparel. It seems
from this examination of output data that concentration of output in large—
scale enterprises is characteristic of a substantial proportion of total
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manufacturing production.
The examination of statistics on the distribution of financial income
indicated that a significant fraction of the business assets of the
nation was accumulated in the area of big business, especially the large
industrials. Big business represented almost a third of the total busi
ness assets. It matched the total assets of the much more numerous group
of intermediate sized industrials, as well as the total assets of the several
million firms of the small business group. The distribution of the national
income shows th~t the major portion of business profits, wages and salaries,
nd managerial income was paid to factors outside of the big business industry.
The changes among the ranks of the 100 largest industrials seems to indicate
that the increase of financial resources of large—scale enterprises has not
meant a decline in the~ range and vigor of competition.
These. observations on the concentration of employment, output, and in
come do lend some light on the position of firms that are powerful enough
to exert influence on the economy. There are indications of high concentra
tion of employment within the business sector among the firms that employ
1,000 and more persons and such firms are oligopolistic, as, the steel in
dustry, automobile industry, and non-ferrous metals industry. These indus
tries also have very high capital requirements, and the concentration ratio
of output is also high. The measure, by value added, is of major significance
in pointing up the similarity in employment and output concentration. It
is expected that in areas of concentrated employment output is also con
centrated. It follows that contributions to the gross national product
or net national product will be larger from these concentrated areas. The
behavior of these oligopolistic industries, then, influence the condition of
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the economy provided there is no mobility of the factors of production
from these areas to other areas of the economy. Herein lies the danger of
domination of the economy by a few powerful firms.
On the measure of performance of big business, we are dependent upon
theoretical predictions as to how a competitive seller, monopolist, or oil—
gopolist will behave, assuming a motive of profit maximization.
The monopolist has a negatively inclined demand curve. Consequently,
in a long—run he has a tendency to earn some amount of excess profits. The
competitive seller has a horizontal, perfectly elastic, demand curve and
does not tend to earn any excess profits. The oligopolopist lies some where
between the monopolist and the competitive seller. ~e has a tendency to earn
some excess profits but not so much as a pure monopolist. His demand curve
is less than perfectly elastic. The fewness of sellers with a desire for
profit maximization suggests the likelihood of concentrated action regard
ing the price policy; therefore, the oligopolist is more likely to approxi
mate the single finn monopolist than the competitive seller.
As to output and employment under monopoly, with given industry demand
and with monopoly marginal cost functions the same as the competitive in
dustry’s supply curve, monopoly will produce a smaller long-run output than
the competitive industry. If economies of scale are favorable, monopoly
may produce either a larger or a smaller output than a competitive industry
would in the same situation. Yet, it appears that even with absolute
superiority over oompetitiofl~in a certain industry,monopoly does not meet
the “ideal outpixb” at which cost is in a certain relation to price. It
does not tend generally to produce to the breakeven point, where price equals
average cost. Restrictions of output carry corresponding restrictions of
I ,I~
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emplo~nnent. In any instance, whore monopoly produces loss than an ideal out
put, fewer factors are employed.
Some virtue is recognized for the individual firm but not the entire
economy in the accumulation of excess profits by monopoly and oligopoly.
Since such firms are able to realize excess profits, they are able to
accumulate funds much more rapidly than producers under competitive
conditions. Also, since the nature of the monopolist firms is such that
they must maintain some sort of agreement, tacit of course, regarding
priàes for the good of the whOle, the relative stability of the industry
is maintained. Agreements need not be explicit, but the action of the firms
within the industryD in order to maximize receptive profit positions or
realize an equilibrium position,means that one cannot get too far out of
line with the abhor else he tips the scales too much and starts a price war.
This is undesirable; therefore, for survival aske no one will act too far
afield; ~bne is~~ compelled to act in unison. This leads us to the realization
that the inflexibilities caused by monopolies put a floor under our economic
system that prevents us from sufferings “hyperdeflation.~ Professor Bould
ing argues,
It is only the inflexibilities in the system that prevent such
a bottomless deflation: if all prices were immediately adjust
able to every shift in demand or liquidity preference, if the
quantity of money were likewise adjustable, as it would be under
pure banking system where bank deposits were the only liquid assets,
and if there was perfect flexibility in peopiots ideas of what the
price level ‘ought’ to be, so that the elasticity of expectations
was independent of the absolute price level, then there would be no
endogenous causes operating to stop a deflation once it had begun.1
The accumulation of capital manifests itself in times of depression by
1Kerineth C. Boulding, “In Defense of Monopoly,” quarterly Journal of
Economics, LIX (August, 1945), 531.
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serving as an insulator, for the individual firm, frcnn the destructive
effects of price deflation. Ralph E. Holden comments,
...so far as an individual enterprise is concerned the existence of
monopoly may serve as a form of insulation from the destructive effects
of price deflation. This will be true when the existence of monopoly
allows a concern to sell its product at a price that is considerably
in excess of average total unit costs and thus earn net profits that
would be impossible were the finn to be operating under oonditions
that more nearly approximated pure competition. Depending on the
price elasticity of demand for the product of such a concern a gen
eral price deflation affecting the economy as a whole may only slightly,
if at all, change the price charged for this product. A sufficient
reduction of demand will cause even monopolistic enterprise to operate
at a loss, but a much larger margin of safety exists for the monopoly
then for competitive enterprises. High cost of marginal producers
operating umier competitive conditions may be forced to operate at a
loss only by a slight reduction in price resulting from a contraction
in demand. Since the major portion of competitive enterprise (the
higher cost producers) by assumption, usually earns smaller net pro
fits than monopolistic enterprise, it has smaller surplus reserves to
utilize during a period of deflation.1
Professor Rothschild comments that,
Deflation means a reduction in output. Under monopolistic con
ditions this reduction is largely brought about by spreading unused
capacity fairly evenly over the whole industry or by the ‘orderly
closing down of some factories. Under a competitive system the
struggle for survival that follows a deflation will leave some firms
with an output not much. below the pre-depress ion level, while others
will go bankrupt. Now it is quite possible that bankruptcies have a
much worse effect on business psychology than the reduction of selling
opportunities through price—fixing, cartellization and trustification.
So far as a high morality among firms discourages investment, quite
apart from what the objective prospects for the future are, monopo
listic arrangement will have a beneficial effect on employment.2
Such observations seem to be evidence which mi~t justify the position
a-Ralph E. Holden, “In Defense of Monopoly-Comments,” quarterly Journal
of Economics, XL (August, 1946), 612—613. Mr. Holden maintains that
monopolies do not check deflation for the economy as a whole, but he does
recognize how it benefits the individual firm. He proceeds to argue, how—
ever, that monopolies may generate deflation for the economy as a whole.
2K. TV. hothschild, “In Defense of Monopoly - Further Comments,” V~uarter
ly Journal of Economics, XV (August, 1946), 516—616.
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of monopoly in times of depression.
On the matter of income distribution, it appears that the profits
recipients tend to have a larger personal income on the average than hired
factors; thus,monopoly tends to increase inequality of personal income dis—
tribut ion.
The payments to employees in wages and salaries are by far the greatest
expenditure of huge corporate busix~sses, but these amounts are spread over
millions of persons, while the profits are spread over a few. This appears
to be different under pure oompetition,where there are no excess profits.
The predictions may hold for an oligopolistic industry as for monopoly,
depending upon its behavior, whether as a monopoly or more nearly a compe
titive industry. The restrictive effects are present,however. If the oh
gopolistic industry is in a sense quasi-competitive, restriction on output
and employment is~ lessened, and a more competitive distribution of income
results.
Empirical evidence, in the case of the Aluminum Company of P~merica and
the rubber tire industry, seems to bear out these theoretical predictions.
Alcoa was a monopolist in the aluminum industry until after World War II,
when two other firms aided by the government joined the industry. The in
dustry then became an oligopoly. The rubber tire industry, with 75 per cent
of its output controlled by the Big Four tire manufacturing, is an oligopoly
in which there is as yet no ready substitute. As components of oligopolistic
industries, these respective firms meet competition with substitute metals,
in the aluminum industry, and varied markets of distribution in the rubber
tire industry. There are indications of competition in both industries.
It may be concluded that in our economy there are relatively high
I IL L~fl~ 1111t
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concentrations of employment, output, and income within the business sector.
Big business appears to take the major role of coordinating individual
efforts and resources into collective achievement. The largest share of
the national income originates in the corporate sector. On the matter of
performance, monopoly and oligopoly seem not to conform to the classioal
concept of competition. In instances of income, the most equitable distri
bution is under competition. Employment and output can be a maximum under
monopoly as well as competition, if the factors are mobile and money prices
coadjust. The creating of excess profits by monopolies serve the individual
firm as an insulator in times of depression but not the entire economy.
Excess profits give rise to- inventions and innovations, as long as they are
protected. Under competition there are no excess profits; therefore, the
incentives to innovate must come from elsewhere. The degree to which these
gains are incentives to inventions and innovations, as well as to increasing
efficient pro~uctivity and security, is a measure of return to the numerous
factors of production1 oonsequently, au enhancement of economic welfare.
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